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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

PART X

JULY TO DECEMBER 1925

263

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	To Mr. Hoare **No. 849**	1925 July 3	Anti-British press campaign. Refers to Part IX, No. 187. Approves his action in regard to anti-British campaign in Turkish press	1
2	Mr. Hoare **No. 511. Conf.**	June 30	Turkish attitude towards decision in regard to Mosul frontier question. Refers to Part IX, Nos. 181 and 182. Transmits despatch from military attaché, who considers that Turks may contemplate formation of troops in eastern vilayets into irregular bands in an attempt to reverse frontier decision if favourable to Mosul	1
3	Mr. Hoare **No. 522**	July 1	Kurdish rebellion. Refers to Part IX, Nos. 175 and 180. Reports result of trial of Sheikh Said and other Kurdish rebels	3
4	Mr. Hoare **No. 538**	„ 8	Treaties of Friendship. Refers to Part VIII, No. 68. Transmits copy of Turco-Spanish Treaty, ratifications of which and of similar treaties with Czechoslovakia, Holland and Norway were exchanged on the 6th July	4
5	Mr. Hoare **No. 540**	„ 8	Turco-German Commercial Treaty. Refers to Part VIII, No. 178. Reports on progress of negotiations and comments on	5
6	Sir M. Cheetham **No. 120. Tel.**	„ 14	Œcumenical Patriarch. Has advised Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to persevere in policy of agreement with Turks	6
7	Mr. Hoare **No. 542**	„ 13	Treaties of Friendship. Refers to No. 4. Ratifications of Treaty with Spain, Czechoslovakia and Sweden, not Norway as previously stated, were exchanged on the 6th July. Treaty with Holland has not been ratified. Treaty with Denmark was ratified on the 7th July	6
8	Mr. Hoare **No. 547**	„ 14	Residence of foreign representatives at Angora. Refers to Part IX, No. 161. Transmits note from Nousret Bey explaining arrangements made for the acquisition of building sites by foreign missions, and for transaction of business with Ministry for Foreign Affairs	6
9	Mr. Hoare **No. 553**	„ 15	Œcumenical Patriarch. Reports election of Mgr. Basil, Metropolitan of Nicaea, and encloses biography	7
10	Mr. Hoare **No. 555**	„ 15	French Ambassador's negotiations regarding Turkish debt and other questions. Refers to Part IX, Nos. 176 and 177. Gives gist of statement issued to press by French Ambassador on his return to Constantinople. M. Sarraut is considerably perturbed at position the Soviet Ambassador has won at Angora	8
11	Mr. Scott **No. 182**	„ 13	Danish-Turkish Treaty of Friendship. Reports ratification at Constantinople on the 6th July. Treaty was signed at Angora on the 26th January	9
12	Mr. Hoare **No. 567**	„ 20	The "Reform Order." Refers to No. 3. Reports on alleged conspiracy to re-establish the ex-Sultan Vahideddin on the throne and the measures taken by the Turkish Government to deal with it	9
13	Mr. Hoare **No. 568**	1925 July 20	Treatment of non-Moslem population. Refers to Part IX, No. 185. American missionary has stated that Syrian Jacobites in neighbourhood of Mardin are living under greatly improved conditions	10
14	Mr. Hoare **No. 575**	„ 21	French Ambassador's negotiations at Angora. Refers to No. 10, and to Part IX, No. 178. Gives gist of conversation with M. Sarraut regarding the latter's negotiations with Turkish Government and his views on Anglo-Turkish relations	11
15	Mr. Eyres **No. 92**	„ 18	Turco-Albanian Treaty of Friendship. Transmits copy of treaty, which was ratified by both parties on the 31st May. Consular Convention has not been carried through, but diplomatic relations are to be established between the two countries	12
16	Mr. Hoare **No. 602**	Aug. 3	Meeting of Grand National Assembly. Reports on proceedings on the 27th July, which consisted of declaration of loyalty to Kemalist régime by Feizi Bey, Deputy for Diarbekr, and discussion of situation in eastern vilayets	16
17	Mr. Hoare **No. 605**	„ 4	Turkish Aeroplane Association. Reports on its activities	17
18	Mr. Hoare **No. 634**	„ 17	Residence of foreign representatives at Angora. Refers to No. 8 and to Part IX, No. 161. Transmits copies of replies returned by Turkish Government to notes from French and Italian Ambassadors respectively	17
19	Mr. Hoare **No. 638**	„ 17	Angora Tribunal of Independence. Reports results of trial of some seventy persons on charges relating to their activities in connection with the "tarikati-selahieh"	19
20	Sir E. Drummond **Telegraphic.**	„ 31	Activities of British fleet. Communicates telegram from Turkish Government drawing attention to alleged infraction of provisions of Article 13 of Treaty of Lausanne and requests comments of His Majesty's Government	19
21	Turkish Ambassador	„ 31	Activities of British fleet. Turkish Government regards them as an attempt to influence decision of Council and requests explanation	20
22	To Mr. London (Geneva) **No. 179. Tel.**	Sept. 1	Activities of British fleet. Refers to No. 20. Explains that there is nothing unusual in them and that Turkish complaint can only be regarded as attempt to prejudice atmosphere at Geneva	21
23	Mr. London (Geneva) **No. 275. Tel.**	„ 2	Activities of British fleet. Refers to No. 22. Enquires whether it can be stated categorically that territorial waters were not entered and whether there was any communication with the shore	21
24	To Turkish Ambassador	„ 3	Activities of British fleet. Refers to No. 21. Explains in detail why Turkish Government's complaint is based on complete misapprehension of true facts of the case	22
25	Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. London (Geneva) **No. 2. Tel.** Sir R. Lindsay **No. 114. Tel.**	„ 4	Activities of British fleet. Explains that although only normal British naval cruises and naval visits to Gallipoli war graves have taken place, the Turks complain about British naval demonstrations in the Levant	22

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
26	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 678**	1925 Sept. 1	Political situation. Reports that the Opposition are crushed, that the Tribunals of Independence are still busy and that the President of the Republic has launched a scheme of modernisation of dress, religion and habits	22
27	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 2. D.O.T. (A)**	„ 2	Closing of the Constantinople Bourse. Reports that Minister of Finance ordered the closing of the Bourse for a week, as from the 29th August, through fear that Mosul negotiations might cause marked fluctuations in value of sterling. Local banks have protested ...	24
28	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 694**	„ 9	Political situation. Refers to No. 26. Reports that the Government has decreed the dissolution of Dervish orders and the confiscation of their property, and laid down regulation for the dress of the clerical and official classes	25
29	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 704**	„ 14	Mosul frontier question. Turkish press continues to be uncompromising and to excite public opinion, while also reproducing the anti-Irak articles of the London press. Increase of Russian influence at Angora and of influence of Turkish extremists are factors in this state of affairs. But things are not likely ultimately to come to an actual breach	26
30	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 705**	„ 14	Mosul frontier question. Comments on the possibility that the sub-committee of the Council may award as far as the Lesser Zab to Turkey. Such an award would present Turkey with a much wanted success, but would increase the difficulties of dealing with the Kurdish minority and would present Turkey with an Arab minority. Fears unfortunate consequences for Turkey in such an event	27
31	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 717**	„ 16	Political situation. Severity of Turkey's repressive policy seems to be diminishing. The Turkish journalists accused of having encouraged the Kurdish rebellion have been acquitted by the Tribunal of Independence. Discusses the probable causes of this moderation	28
32	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 119. Tel. Conf.**	„ 21	Turkish troop movements, travel restrictions and Russian naval movements. Reports eastward movement of Turkish troops, restrictions on movements of foreigners and arrival of Russian destroyers at Constantinople	29
33	Mr. Keeling ... ... **No. 146. Tel. Conf.**	„ 24	Græco-Italian rapprochement. Reports Italian suggestion to Greece that the two countries should consider eventual collaboration in Asia Minor	30
34	Mr. Keeling ... ... **No. 147. Tel. Conf.**	„ 24	Græco-Italian rapprochement. Refers to No. 33. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs favours rapprochement with Italy and would welcome expression of views of His Majesty's Government	30
35	Mr. Keeling ... ... **No. 148. Tel.**	„ 24	Græco-Italian relations. Reports approaching visit of Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Greece to continue discussion	30
36	British Delegation ... (Geneva) **Telegraphic.**	„ 24	Settlement of Armenian refugees in Caucasus. The Fifth Committee have invited the Council to appoint a commission to ascertain finally the technical possibility of carrying out irrigation works in order to permit the settlement of refugees in Soviet Armenia and to report on the possibility of raising a loan of 9 million gold roubles to execute the works	30
37	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 720**	„ 22	Conditions at Angora. Transmits a report by Mr. Helm on the political and municipal situation	31

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
38	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 723**	1925 Sept. 23	Mosul frontier question. Discusses Turkish press comments on the Mosul discussions at Geneva, also a Turkish suggestion of a pact between Turkey, Irak, Persia and Great Britain	33
39	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 724. Conf.**	„ 23	Political situation. Refers to No. 37. Reports that situation is calm; that foreigners are forbidden to travel by rail east of Konia; that there are rumours of Turkish troop movements eastwards and that two Russian destroyers have visited Constantinople ...	34
40	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 725**	„ 23	Legal advisers for Turkey. Transmits copy of a Turkish note announcing the appointment of three foreign legal advisers	35
41	To Mr. Keeling ... **No. 115. Tel. Conf.**	„ 29	Græco-Italian agreement. Refers to Nos. 33 and 34. M. Rentis is to be informed that His Majesty's Government cannot express an opinion without more precise information of scope of proposed agreement ...	35
42	To Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 126. Tel. Very Conf.**	Oct. 2	Mosul frontier question. Refers to Nos. 29 and 30. Reports statement of a member of the Turkish Embassy that Turkey will certainly fight, if necessary, and that a treaty with Russia will be signed in case of emergency. Can anything definite about Russian intrigue be ascertained?	35
43	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 734. Secret.**	Sept. 28	Political situation. Refers to No. 29. Reports that the President is becoming more and more the absolute dictator of the State. Discusses the influence of Ismet Pasha and of Tewfik Rushdi on him and comments on Rejeb	36
44	Mr. Chilton ... ... **No. 1440**	Oct. 1	Turco-American relations. Reports on Rear-Admiral Bristol's efforts to secure recognition of Turkey by the United States of America	36
45	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 781. Conf.**	„ 6	Russo-Turkish relations. Refers to No. 42. Reports German Ambassador's opinion that no treaty existed between Turkey and Russia, and that Turkey had no intention at present of committing themselves to Russia	37
46	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 756**	„ 6	Kurdish situation. Discusses a rumour of the recrudescence of Kurdish unrest	37
47	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 769. Conf.**	„ 12	Political situation. Refers to Part IX, No. 167. Reports M. Radev's views on Turco-Bulgarian relations, the Mosul and Kurdish questions, Turco-Russian relations; the position of Ismet Pasha and the reason of Ismet's refusal to receive Sir R. Lindsay in May 1925	38
48	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 773**	„ 13	Political situation. Reports journey of the President to Brussa and his relations with the ex-Khedive; his journey to Smyrna and insistence on modernisation of Turkey. Comments on the methods of two bye-elections at Constantinople	39
49	To the Marquess of Crewe **No. 3486**	„ 22	Events in Syria. Reports that the Secretary of State has impressed on the French Ambassador the undesirability of acceding to the Turkish requests for permission to send troops eastward through Syria and has also mentioned the serious view which he takes of the disturbances in Damascus	40
50	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 785**	„ 16	Anglo-Turkish relations. Reports that Turkish distrust of Russia, Turkish desire for peace and time to carry out her policy of modernisation and secularisation tend to show that events are shaping towards Anglo-Turkish friendship, the Mosul question being the only stumbling block	41

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
51	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 736** ...	1925 Oct. 18	Turco-Persian relations. Reports that Tewfik Rushdi Bey, in a press interview, mentioned the increasing cordiality of relations with Persia and complimented Reza Khan. The latter's anti-Russian proclivities are probably responsible for this declaration	43
52	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 791** ...	„ 20	Political situation. Refers to No. 50. Reports that a living Turkish nationalism has taken the place of the anti-national régime of the Sultans, and that the present reforms are unlikely to be checked by a reaction in favour of the House of Osman and of religion. Kurdistan is, however, a menace	43
53	Mr. Stevenson **No. 227** ...	„ 22	Turco-Bulgarian relations. Reports the conclusion between Turkey and Bulgaria of (1) a treaty of friendship; (2) a protocol about minority rights and property of refugees; and (3) a convention about nationals of one country residing in the other	45
54	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 802** ...	„ 24	Turco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 53. Reports certain additional information obtained from M. Radev regarding the recently concluded agreements	45
55	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 809** ...	„ 27	Turco-Persian relations. Refers to No. 51. Reports a visit of the Persian Ambassador and latter's views on Tewfik Rushdi's remarks about Persia and Reza Khan	46
56	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 815** ...	„ 29	Turkish infractions of the Minorities Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne. Refers to Part IX, No. 60. Transmits a memorandum showing that unfair treatment of minorities continues without, however, providing flagrant cases on which to base representations. Points out an Armenian and Hebrew tendency to waive their treaty rights and to assimilate themselves under the law to the Moslem majority	47
57	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 816** ...	„ 31	Turco-American relations. Refers to No. 44. Reports the visit of the American Chargé d'Affaires in quest of material to counter the American campaign against ratification, and his enquiry as to how Turkey was observing her treaty obligations and, particularly, the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne	54
58	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 827** ...	Nov. 4	Political situation. Reports the inauguration of the new session of the Grand National Assembly and gives a summary of the President's opening speech and of his references to Kurdistan, Russia, Mosul and the Locarno Pact	54
59	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 841** ...	„ 10	Political situation. Reports Ismet Pasha's speech at the first debate of the new session of the National Assembly and his references to relations with Balkan States, the Ottoman Public Debt and the Mosul question	56
60	Mr. Erskine ... **No. 244** ...	„ 19	Turco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 53. Reports the opposition of Bulgarian refugees from Thrace to the ratification of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty ...	58
61	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 863** ...	„ 23	Political situation. Refers to No. 58. Reports unfavourable attitude of Turkish Prime Minister and of Minister for Foreign Affairs towards the Locarno Treaties and the latter's views on Balkan relations. Also reports Turkish press attempt to divide France and Great Britain	59
62	Sir R. Lindsay **No. 865** ...	„ 23	Conditions at Angora. Refers to Part IX, No. 131. Reports that the building of the capital is making progress and describes the spirit of the inhabitants ...	60

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
63	To Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 1151**	1925 Nov. 30	Position of Kurds in Irak. Refers to No. 50. States that His Majesty's Government are bound by their assurances to the League of Nations to see that the Kurds in Irak are granted a measure of autonomy, but there is no idea of creating an autonomous Kurdish State or of reviving the policy contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres	61
64	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 138. Tel.**	Dec. 3	Landing of war material at Trebizond. His Majesty's consul at Trebizond reports the arrival of artillery and munitions from Constantinople	62
65	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 880**	„ 1	Internal unrest. Reports disturbances at Erzerum, Sivas, Samsun, Rizeh and Marash, mainly caused by the regulations for wearing hats	63
66	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 883**	„ 2	Conditions at Angora. Transmits report by Mr. Leeper on his visit to Angora and his impression that an attack on Mosul is contemplated mainly on account of the representations of Fevzi Pasha	64
67	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 892**	„ 8	Turkish infractions of the Minorities Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne. Refers to No. 56. Reports Turkish pressure on Armenian, Hebrew and Greek minorities to waive Lausanne Treaty rights and success attending Turkish efforts	67
68	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 142. Tel.**	„ 16	Military activity in Trebizond district. His Majesty's consul reports movements of guns towards Erzerum and the possible connection of these movements with Laz disaffection as result of the abolition of the fez ...	69
69	To Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 149. Tel.**	„ 17	Mosul frontier question. Refers to Foreign Office despatch No. 1159 (see "Eastern (Mosul)," Part XVII). Secretary of State, on the 4th December, warned the Turkish Ambassador, who went subsequently to Paris to see the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. If the Turkish Government have not been warned, they should now receive a warning ...	70
70	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 903**	„ 15	Political situation. Refers to No. 65. Reports Ismet Pasha's admission about revolts in various parts of Turkey and transmits information supplied by the correspondent of the "Journal des Débats" about a journey to Eastern Anatolia	70
71	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 145. Tel.**	„ 20	Mosul frontier question. Refers to No. 69. Reports that Turkish delegate had not heard of Secretary of State's conversation of the 4th December with Turkish Ambassador, and that a copy of Foreign Office despatch No. 1159 was handed to him and he was informed of declaration made by Secretary of State after delivery of League's decision	72
72	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 147. Tel.**	„ 23	Russo-Turkish Treaty. Reports publication in the press of Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Paris on the 17th December and gives substance of it	73
73	Sir R. Lindsay ... **No. 930**	„ 23	Russo-Turkish Treaty. Forwards text of the treaty and three protocols annexed thereto	74

ERRATUM

Page 54, No. 57, paragraph 2, end of first line should be "arguments on."

Subject Index.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

Aeroplane Association.—17.

Albania, treaty with Turkey.—15.

Anglo-Turkish relations.—14, 50.

Angora—
Residence of foreign Ambassadors at.—*See* Diplomats.
Conditions at.—37, 62, 66.

Anti-British press campaign.—1.

Armenian refugees in Caucasus, settlement of.—36.

Basil, Mgr., elected Patriarch.—9.

Bourse, closing of Constantinople.—26, 27.

Bulgaria—
Relations with Turkey.—47.
Treaty with Turkey.—53, 54, 60.

Constantinople Bye-elections.—48.

Czechoslovakia, treaty with Turkey.—4, 7.

Denmark, treaty with Turkey.—7, 11.

Diplomats, residence at Angora of foreign.—8, 18.

Eastern Asia Minor, conditions in.—70.

Feizi Bey, deputy for Diarbekr, accused of disloyalty.—10.

Fleet, movements of British.—20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

Germany, commercial agreement with Turkey.—5.

Greece—
Relations with Turkey.—6.
See Italo-Greek relations.

Holland, treaty with Turkey.—4, 7.

Independence Tribunal, activities of.—2, 3, 12, 16, 19, 26, 31.

Irak—
Frontier dispute.—*See* Mosul.
Kurds in.—50, 63.

Ismet Pasha, reason for refusal to see Sir R. Lindsay.—47.

Italo-Greek relations.—33, 34, 35, 41.

Journalists, arrest of Turkish.—12, 19, 31.

Khedive's activities.—48.

Kurdistan, problem, situation, revolt.—2, 3, 16, 19, 46, 50, 52, 58.

Kurds in Irak, position.—50, 63.

League of Nations, Turkish protest about British fleet movements.—*See* Fleet.

Legal Advisers, appointment of foreign.—40.

Locarno, Turkish views on.—58, 61.

Mardin, conditions at.—13.

Military activity in Turkey.—2, 32, 39, 49, 64, 68.

Minorities, treatment of.—13, 56, 67.

Modernisation of Turkey.—26, 28, 48.

Monasteries, suppression of.—3, 26, 28.

Mosul—
Irak frontier dispute.—29, 30, 38, 47, 58, 59.
M. Sarraut's views.—14.
Turkish forces on frontier.—2.
Turkish threat to.—2, 32, 39, 42, 66, 69, 71.

Mustapha Kemal.—43, 48.

Ottoman Public Debt.—10, 14, 59.

Patriarch.—6, 9.

Persia—
Relations with Turkey.—51, 55.
Suggested Turkish pact with.—38.

Political situation.—14, 26, 28, 43, 47, 48, 52, 58, 70.

Press—
See Anti-British campaign.
See Journalists.

Reform order or sect and its connection with Sultan Vahideddin.—12, 19.

Soviet—
Relations with Turkey.—10, 29, 32, 39, 42, 43, 45, 50, 51, 58, 59.
Treaty with Turkey.—72, 73.

Spain, treaty with Turkey.—4, 7.

Sweden, treaty with Turkey.—7.

Syria—
Passage of Turkish troops through.—49.
Situation in.—49.

Treaties and Treaty negotiations with—
Albania.—15.
Bulgaria.—47, 53, 54, 60.
Czechoslovakia.—4, 7.
Denmark.—7, 11.
Germany.—5.
Holland.—4, 7.
Russia.—72, 73.
Spain.—4, 7.
Sweden.—7.
United States.—44, 57.

Turkism.—52.

United States of America, non-ratification of Turkish Treaty.—44, 57.

Unrest in Turkey.—65, 70.

Vahideddin, ex-Sultan.—12.

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part X.

[E 3830/32/65] No. 1.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople).

(No. 649.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1925.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 500 of the 24th June relative to the continued anti-British campaign in the Turkish press, and I approve your action as reported therein.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3970/362/65] No. 2.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 511. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 30, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 87 of the 17th instant regarding Turkish troop movements, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from the military attaché reporting that, according to such information as he has been able to obtain, there are at the present time over 50,000 troops in the eastern vilayets.

2. Major Harenc reports that he is now of opinion that the Turks may be contemplating, in the event of the Mosul frontier question being decided in favour of Irak, an attempt to effect a practical reversal of that decision by creating strong "Chetta" bands, which would presumably be recruited from the troops in the neighbourhood of the frontier, the men being especially "demobilised" for that purpose. No doubt the Turkish political conscience is sufficiently plastic to reconcile an unofficial invasion of Irak by such bands with the very categorical assurances given in the note enclosed in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 469 of the 10th June.

3. However, it is certainly too soon to conclude that there is any intention to take or even to threaten any action against Irak. The proceedings of the Independence Tribunal at Diarbekir and the savagery of Turkish justice against the Kurdish sheikhs condemned for participation in the recent rising, on which I am reporting separately, afford an entirely sufficient reason for the maintenance of strong forces in that part of the country. If nothing happens in Kurdistan during the next few weeks and there is no sensible diminution in the number of troops within reach of the Irak frontier it will no doubt become necessary to ask for something more concrete than friendly assurances. For the present I would suggest that the less we say the better in order not to weaken, by dilution, the force of any representation that may become necessary.

4. I should add that twice within the last fortnight prominence has been given in the press to the return westwards of troops for demobilisation. References to troop movements are never allowed, and in these cases there can be little doubt that they were inserted, not too ingenuously, for our benefit.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Bagdad and Beirut.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Major Harenc to Mr. Hoare.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 25, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an estimate of the Turkish forces, in what is known as the eastern vilayets, on the 20th instant.

2. This is based on the strength as known to the War Office of the Turkish Army Corps in that area prior to the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion, and the figures, given by reliable sources, of the troops that moved into that area since the outbreak. This includes the Vth Corps, which is, according to the papers, being sent back to its peace stations, but has not yet passed over that portion of the Bagdad Railway which lies in French mandated territory.

3. The total estimate is: sabres 1,750, rifles 49,000, guns 108. In my previous despatches Nos. 5, 7 and 14 to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, I have discussed the uses to which such a large body of troops could be put. I came to the conclusion that, from the Turkish point of view, it is not worth while to make an attack on Irak, and the retention of these troops after the rebellion had been declared at an end was due to the necessity of keeping a large force in the country while the reforms in the administrative system were being instituted, the communications improved and the country generally civilised. I also envisaged the possibility that the Turkish authorities had at the back of their mind the moral effect that a large force in the vicinity of the Mosul frontier would have on the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations.

4. When my despatches Nos. 5 and 7 on this subject were written, the Turkish press, which is an organisation more or less inspired by the Government, was issuing articles expressing the most complete confidence in a decision in Turkey's favour of the question of the Mosul frontier. But yesterday, from a source which has hitherto been absolutely reliable, I received information to the effect that, those responsible for the direction of Turkey's policy were not only doubtful of the issue of the Mosul question, but were practically convinced that the decision would be favourable to Irak.

5. If this information is correct it is a possible solution of the problem. The Turkish High Command considers that it was the presence of a large Turkish force in the neighbourhood of Chanak which forced on the negotiations at Mudania. Kemal-ed-din Sami Pasha practically said that we had been frightened out of Chanak. The French were obliged to withdraw from Marash and Aintab in 1921 by reason of the tactics employed by the Turks, namely, the formation of a large number of "Chetta" bands, equipped with machine guns, rifles and ammunition supplied by Government, with a stiffening of regular officers and backed up by a strong Turkish regular force behind them. It would appear at least possible that, with these two operations as a precedent, the Turkish High Command is contemplating a repetition of the manœuvres which, from their point of view, were so successful in 1921 and 1922.

6. Unless definite information is received of the return of the Vth Corps and the 5th Division to their peace stations I submit that it is necessary to consider the possibility of the Turks carrying out a "Chetta" attack on Irak similar to the one they made in Northern Cilicia.

I have, &c.
R. E. HARENC.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

ESTIMATE of the Turkish Troops in the Eastern Vilayets, June 20, 1925.

1. *Force in the Eastern Vilayets, February 15, 1925.*

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
VIIth Corps—			
8th Cavalry Division	500	..	8
28th Infantry Regiment	..	500	..
1st Cavalry Division	500	..	8
14th Cavalry Division	500	..	8
2nd Infantry Division	50	3,000	24
17th Infantry Division	50	3,000	24
	1,600	6,500	72

2. *Forces moved into that Area by Rail.*

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
Vth Corps—			
7th Infantry Division	50	6,750	24
41st Infantry Division	50	6,750	24
Corps troops	..	1,500	..
Reinforcements to VIIth Corps—			
To make up their infantry regiments to war strength	..	9,250	..
For 1st Cavalry Division (nearly wiped out at commencement of rebellion) ..	500	..	..
	600	24,250	48

Taking personnel of a battery at 100; add to this figure for personnel of artillery 1,200, which gives a total of forces moved over the Bagdad Railway of 25,450, which is approximately the same as the figure given by the liaison officer, Beirut.

3. There is no doubt that the 5th Division from the Tokat area also took part in the operations, presumably at war strength; this would give for the forces employed:—

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
Vth Corps	100	13,500	48
5th Division	50	6,750	12
VIIth Corps	1,600	15,750	48
Corps troops	..	3,000	..
3 Frontier battalions	..	3,000	..
Gendarmerie	..	7,000	..
	1,750	49,000	108

Add for personnel of artillery 2,700; gives a total of 49,450.

This is considerably lower than the figure given by General Sarrail (telegram No. 287 from Highcoma, Bagdad, to Secretary of State for Colonies, dated the 4th June, 1925, repeated to Constantinople, No. 195). But I think that the French Intelligence have always put the strength of the infantry units of the VIIth Corps at too high a figure.

[E 3974/1091/44] No. 3.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 522.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 1, 1925.*

IN continuation of Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 468 of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the trial before the Diarbekr Independence Tribunal of Sheikh Said and of other persons implicated with him in the Kurdish rebellion was terminated on the 28th ultimo, after lasting nearly a month. No details of any serious public interest regarding the evidence produced during these proceedings have been published. Sheikh Said and more than forty of the other accused were condemned to death, a smaller number were condemned to terms of penal servitude and imprisonment, while the tribal Major Kassim, who gave State evidence during the trial, and fifteen or twenty others were acquitted. In addition, the tribunal ordered that the monasteries and convents in the eastern vilayets should be closed down on the grounds that they had been used by the sheikhs to establish over the ignorant population an ascendancy based on the grossest superstition.

2. After pronouncing sentence, the president of the tribunal is reported by the Anatolian agency to have addressed the condemned as follows:—

"Certain of you banded yourselves together to advance your personal interests, while others were guided by foreign propaganda and political ambition. You all worked for the same object, namely, the foundation of an independent Kurdistan. In bringing about the general rising, which you had meditated for years, you left

this region in fire. Owing to the energetic action of the Government of the republic, your reactionary revolt was immediately suppressed by the deadly blows of the republican army, and you were all captured and brought here to render an account in the presence of justice. Everyone must know that the Government of the young republic will not tolerate sedition, reaction or any kind of evil activity, and that by decisive measures it will afford neither time nor place for such crimes. The wretched population of these regions, who for years have been crushed under the tyranny of the sheikhs, aghas and beys, and whose property and lives have been sacrificed to the whims of these persons, delivered at last from your evil power, will advance along the roads of prosperity and progress of our republic in peace and happiness, while you will pay with your lives on the gallows of justice for the blood you have shed and the homes you have destroyed. This is the dread, but just, sentence of the laws of the republic."

3. The Public Prosecutor having informed the tribunal that he renounced his right of delaying for three days the carrying out of the sentence, those condemned to death were hanged before dawn on the 29th June in an open space near the old Aleppo Gate at Diarbekr.

4. The local Turkish newspapers publish in tones of ferocious exultation gruesome details received from their special correspondents of the executions, describing how those present—journalists, artisans and others—competed to take a personal part in the hangings, and report at length the remarks made by the condemned and their demeanour. In recording the execution of these leaders of the Kurdish race, the press has followed to the end the line mentioned in His Majesty's Ambassador's despatch No. 435 of the 2nd June of holding them up to public ridicule.

5. It is reported that the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Vilayets will shortly transfer its seat to Urfa.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4099/4099/44] No. 4

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 538.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 8, 1925.*

WITH reference to Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 721 of the 1st October last, reporting that a Treaty of Friendship had been signed by Turkey and Spain on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of this treaty, which I have received from the Spanish Legation, and to report that the exchange of ratifications provided for in article 3 took place at the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 6th instant. The ratifications of the similar Treaties of Friendship concluded by Turkey with Czechoslovakia, Holland and Norway were also exchanged at the delegation on the 6th instant.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Spain.

L'ESPAGNE d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part, animés du désir d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre le Royaume d'Espagne et la République turque et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un Traité d'Amitié, et ont à cet effet nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne : son Excellence Don Juan Servert y Vest, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne ;

Le Président de la République turque : son Excellence Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre le Royaume d'Espagne et la République turque ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux parties.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États, conformément aux principes du droit des gens. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople le plus tôt que faire se pourra.

Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Angora, le 27 septembre 1924.

JUAN SERVERT.
TEWFIK KIAMIL.

[E 4100/544/44] No. 5.

Mr. Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 540.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 8, 1925.*

IN his despatch No. 460 of the 8th June, His Majesty's Ambassador reported the stage which had been reached in the Turco-German negotiations for a commercial treaty.

2. Shortly after this despatch was written the German Ambassador proceeded to Angora and the negotiations continued until last week, when the Bairam holidays made a suspension necessary. Herr Nadolny then returned to Constantinople, and leaves again to-morrow morning in order to attend the next plenary sitting, which takes place on the 11th instant.

3. I am not aware as to the exact stage which has been reached in the negotiations, but, as you will have seen from Sir R. Lindsay's despatch, the German Government were endeavouring to conclude a *modus vivendi* in order that trade should not be hampered. Herr Nadolny had almost given up hope of obtaining even this until he was suddenly informed by Nusret Bey on the 6th instant that the Turkish Government had now agreed to the conclusion of a *modus vivendi* arrangement, under which German goods will be admitted under the tariff of the Lausanne Treaty, and Turkish imports into Germany will enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment. On reading the note in which this information was conveyed, Herr Nadolny saw to his surprise that the consent of the Council of Ministers to this arrangement had been given as long ago as the 19th February. Herr Nadolny further told me that he expects his further negotiations to be long and arduous, but that, having got his *modus vivendi*, he was in no hurry. He had tried, but quite in vain, to remove their objections to a most-favoured-nation treaty, which they regard as savouring of Capitulations.

4. It is almost incredible that the Turkish administrative machinery should have worked in the disorganised manner indicated above, but as I obtained this information from Herr Nadolny himself I can only believe it is true.

5. Whatever may be the reason for such action, I can only suppose that the Turks, who have infinitely more to lose than the Germans by the absence of any agreement, were thoroughly frightened by the agreement which the German and Greek Governments had concluded, and suddenly realised that they must put into force the concession for which the final consent had already been granted.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

No. 6.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July 14, 1925.*

ON news of private telegram from Germanos, Minister for Foreign Affairs approached me with request for intervention by His Majesty's Government. I said this was quite out of the question and that Greece and Turkey must settle their own difficulties. I advised Minister for Foreign Affairs, in spite of provocation, to persevere in recent Greek policy of agreement with Turks. He thought that in that case it would be best to go the whole way and to ratify as they stood protocols signed by late Government, which it was proposed to modify. He said he would advise Prime Minister in this sense.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 21.)

[E 4245/4099/44] No. 7.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 542.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 13, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 538 of the 8th instant, transmitting a copy of the Treaty of Friendship signed by Turkey and Spain on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to report that the information given in that despatch respecting the exchange of ratifications, although obtained from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is not altogether correct. The delegation now inform me that the ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship with Spain and of the similar treaties with Czechoslovakia and Sweden, not Norway as stated, were exchanged at the delegation on the 6th instant. The ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship with Holland have not yet been exchanged, as Holland has not yet ratified. Ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Denmark were exchanged at the delegation on the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4230/109/44] No. 8.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 547.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 14, 1925.*

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 333 of the 28th April regarding the residence of the foreign representatives in Turkey, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply which I have received to the note of the 26th April, a copy of which was enclosed in the despatch under reference.

2. This reply appears to me to be quite satisfactory and does not, in my opinion, call for any further action on the part of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Nouret Bey to Mr. Hoare.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *Constantinople, le 12 juillet 1925.*

EN réponse à la note que son Excellence Sir R. Lindsay a bien voulu m'adresser le 26 avril 1925, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ayant voté la loi autorisant le Gouvernement à offrir aux missions diplomatiques étrangères des terrains pour la construction de leur Ambassade ou Légation, ces terrains seront mis prochainement à la disposition des susdites missions.

En ce qui concerne le second alinéa de la note susmentionnée de son Excellence Sir R. Lindsay, sans vouloir entrer en discussion sur le principe reconnu suivant lequel

c'est pour l'établissement des relations internationales et pour les besoins réciproques des États intéressés, que ceux-ci se font représenter dans leurs capitales respectives, je crois devoir préciser que dans la note du 19 mars 1925 de M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères il n'a pas été question de mettre en doute le fait également reconnu de la liberté de déplacement ainsi que de séjour temporaire dans telle ou telle localité que possèdent naturellement les Ambassadeurs ou Ministres et leur suite.

En outre, en tenant compte des difficultés matérielles du moment et dans le but de donner aux représentants étrangers le temps voulu pour s'assurer le comfort personnel qui leur est nécessaire, le Gouvernement de la République a laissé provisoirement à Constantinople un fonctionnaire du Département des Affaires étrangères en qualité de délégué; mais il ne saurait, naturellement, être question de maintenir indéfiniment une telle délégation.

Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de vous assurer qu'il n'a en vue que de resserrer encore davantage les bonnes relations existant actuellement entre les deux pays.

Veuillez, &c.
M. NOUSRET.

[E 4233/55/44] No. 9.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 553.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 15, 1925.*

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 434 of the 2nd June, I have the honour to inform you that Mgr. Basil, Metropolitan of Nicæa, was elected Œcumenical Patriarch on the 13th instant by 13 votes to 2. I enclose a record of his life which has been supplied to me by the dragoman of the Patriarchate.

2. The election did not proceed without incident, for shortly before it was due to start a party of men led by a certain Damaniadis, who in 1923 had attempted a *coup* against the Patriarch Meletios, tried to rush the Patriarchate, stating that they had come to elect the Patriarch themselves. However, with the help of the police, who arrived quickly on the scene, order was restored and the election took place.

3. Another incident, which occurred on the eve of the election, is perhaps worth mentioning. Shortly before midnight three individuals went to the house of Mgr. Germanos, Metropolitan of Sardis, and told him that the Vali and the director of the police wished to see him. He duly complied with these instructions, but after the party had been driving a short distance the car suddenly stopped at a lonely spot, the prelate was seized and his assailants proceeded to cut off his beard and hair. Having done this they left him and departed. I am not aware that he was a likely candidate for the patriarchal throne, but it is possible that the three individuals, who have not been caught, thought that by their action they might prejudice his chances of election.

4. Yesterday morning an official of the Patriarchate called at the Pera Embassy and stated that he had been instructed to announce the election of the Patriarch. There would be no written announcement. At the same time his Holiness would be glad to receive the congratulations of the heads of the diplomatic missions. After consulting one or two of my colleagues, I have decided to confine my greetings to an ordinary "p.f." card.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Biography supplied by the Patriarchate.

SA Sainteté Basile III, élu Archevêque de Constantinople, Nouvelle-Rome et Patriarche œcuménique le 13 juillet 1925, est né en 1850 à Scutari de Constantinople. Appartenant à une famille notable des Géorgiadès, il a fait ses premières études à Constantinople et puis en Grèce. Diplômé de la Faculté de Théologie de l'Université d'Athènes, il a été nommé en 1893 Professeur de Théologie et de Philosophie et de l'ancien Hébreu à l'École théologique de Halki, charge qu'il a remplie pendant sept ans avec beaucoup de succès. En 1880, il s'est rendu en France, en Angleterre, en

Allemagne et en Italie. A Londres, il a fait des études approfondies sur différents manuscrits grecs théologiques et byzantins.

Rentré à Constantinople en 1884, il a été nommé Directeur de l'École patriarcale du Phanar (séminaire), qu'il a complètement réformée et réorganisée.

En 1889, il a été élu Métropolitain d'Anchialos et en 1895 il a été invité à Constantinople comme membre du Saint-Synode du Patriarcat œcuménique pour la première fois. Il fit partie avec le Métropolitain de Nicomédie, Mgr. Philothée, de la délégation patriarcale qui s'est rendue en Russie pour assister au couronnement de Sa Majesté le Tsar Nicolas II. Il a gouverné le diocèse d'Anchialos jusqu'à 1906, date à laquelle ont eu lieu les événements connus contre les Grecs orthodoxes de Bulgarie et la destruction de la ville, dont à peine a-t-il réussi à se sauver. Rentré à Constantinople du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Joachim III, il a été envoyé peu après à Chypre en mission spéciale comme Exarque patriarcal. En 1909 il a été élu Métropolitain de Pélagonie (Monastir, Macédoine), diocèse qu'il a gouverné jusqu'à 1910. En cette année-ci il a été élu Métropolitain de Nicée, charge qu'il a occupée jusqu'à ce jour. Pendant qu'il gouvernait ce diocèse, il a été invité une première fois du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Germanos V, et une dernière fois du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Mélétios IV, comme membre du Saint-Synode, charge dont il a été investi jusqu'à son élection au siège patriarcal œcuménique.

Sa Sainteté Basile III est connue pour sa haute et profonde érudition. On peut dire de lui qu'il est le plus savant parmi tous les prélats du trône œcuménique. Il a publié de nombreux ouvrages ecclésiastiques. D'un caractère droit et ferme, il est connu pour ses sentiments de compassion envers les pauvres et les nécessiteux.

Le 14 *juillet* 1925.

[E 4235/109/44] No. 10.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 555.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 15, 1925.

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 436 of the 2nd June, I have the honour to inform you that the French Ambassador returned to Constantinople from Angora on Saturday last. The immediate cause of his return was his desire to be present at the 14th July celebrations at his Embassy in Constantinople.

2. I have been unable to see his Excellency since his return owing to a slight indisposition from which he is suffering, but from an interview which he has given to the press, and from some remarks made to the counsellor of the Italian Embassy, I should not gather that he has achieved much, if anything.

3. In his statement to the press M. Sarraut remarked that he had not settled anything sensational, and that he had discussed many outstanding questions with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who had promised to look into them, and that he was now awaiting their solution. As regards the "coupons" question, he said that he had mentioned it incidentally to Tewfik Rushdi Bey, but that, as it was not for them to discuss, nothing had been settled. He added, "if negotiations on this subject are to be opened, they can only take place directly between the bondholders and the Turkish Government or its delegates. Turkish delegates have gone to Paris to discuss the division of the debt, and it is they who should be approached directly for discussion and negotiation. Personally, I regard this question from the point of view of Turkish interests as well as of French interests. But that is my personal point of view, and once more it is not for me to negotiate this question." Other statements in this interview are hardly worth reporting.

4. To M. Talliani the Ambassador expatiated at considerable length on the lines of his interview with His Majesty's Ambassador, as reported in his despatch No. 440 of the 2nd June. I gather that he is considerably perturbed by the position which the Soviet Ambassador has won at Angora, and that, in his opinion, it will be necessary for Western European nations to exercise the utmost patience in dealing with the Turks lest Bolshevik influence acquire a dangerous ascendancy in this country.

5. I hope to see M. Sarraut in the course of the next few days.

I have, &c
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4261/821/44] No. 11.

Mr. Scott to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Copenhagen, July* 13, 1925.

WITH reference to Lord Granville's despatch No. 24 of the 4th February, I have the honour to report that a Danish Foreign Office communiqué has appeared in the press stating that, according to telegraphic information received from the Danish Legation at Constantinople, the ratification documents of the Danish-Turkish Treaty of Friendship were exchanged at Constantinople on the 6th instant.

2. The treaty was signed at Angora on the 26th January.

I have, &c.
O. A. SCOTT.

[E 4379/1895/44] No. 12.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 567.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 20, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that since the end of the trial of Sheikh Said (reported in my despatch No. 522 of the 1st instant) the press has devoted a good deal of its space to another conspiracy which the Government claims to have unearthed, and with the investigation of which it has entrusted the Angora Independence Tribunal. It is stated that under the auspices of the ex-Sultan Vahideddin, an organisation which calls itself the "Reform Order" or "Reform Sect" has been working for his re-establishment on the throne. From the fragmentary reports which are made public it is difficult to form a cohesive idea even of the Government's view of the case, but it appears to be somewhat as follows:—

2. The Reform Order was, it is stated, founded in 1920 by Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, then Minister of War, for the purpose of raising the fallen prestige of Islam by means of a world-wide Moslem union or freemasonry. Its basis was religious and its first principle loyalty to the Sultan Caliph. The order was framed with a hierarchy of many degrees, the highest of which belonged to the Sultan. Its centres were given religious names, such as "tekkieh" and convent. It took cover behind a number of anti-Kemalist organisations, such as the "Association of Freedom and *Entente*," the "Resuscitation of the Fatherland Association," the "Friends of Anatolia," the "Mentors," and it embraced members of dervish orders. It sent emissaries to Egypt, India, Irak and Syria. But the whole movement came to a halt with the victory of the Kemalist forces and the flight of Sultan Vahideddin.

3. The Government asserts that the Reform Order has recently been active again, that its adherents in Turkey have been in touch with the ex-Sultan at San Remo, with Prince Selim and Prince Nizameddin in Syria, and with Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, Mehmed Ali Bey (an ex-Minister of the Interior), Ismail Bey of Gumuljina and other political refugees in Roumania, Greece, Cyprus, Syria and Irak, and that their object is to bring Vahideddin back again to the throne, even at the cost of foreign intervention. Further, it is asserted that Sheikh Said and his fellow rebels were working in accord with the Reform Order, and that contact was kept up between the conspirators in different parts of Anatolia by means of agents who hawked patent medicines. Of all this the Government claims to have documentary or oral evidence, and the press reports at intervals the imminent publication of sensational details. Certain cafés and other meeting places here have been raided, and, it is said, details of the organisation have been found. The distance from the Independence Tribunal to the gallows, too, has latterly proved so short that prisoners are apt to make very full confessions in the hope of saving their necks.

4. There cannot, I think, be much doubt that for personal reasons, from habitual discontent and from conservatism, a large section of the population would like to see the end of the Kemalist régime. But that there has been afoot such an active conspiracy as the Government alleges is less likely. It is possible that the ex-Sultan and his scattered followers have been in correspondence from abroad with persons in Turkey. But they could hardly hope to restore the Sultan without the co-operation of Rauf Bey and the leaders of the now extinguished Opposition. These latter appear to have been lying very low, in view of the great activity of the secret police

and the independence tribunals. Perhaps the Opposition leaders would be prepared at a favourable moment to bring the Sultan back on terms, but there has been no indication that they have been seeking the help of the Reform Order.

5. I incline rather to the belief that there has been some ineffectual correspondence between the ex-Sultan's followers abroad and in Turkey, and that he lent some moral support to the Kurdish rebellion. The Government having at hand the convenient instrument of the independence tribunals, would naturally take the opportunity of dealing in exemplary fashion with all persons whom it had any reason or pretext for suspecting as reactionary. The accounts which appear are very vague, and I fancy that many of the offences under enquiry are old enough to be covered by the amnesty; but this plea, if invoked, is not published.

6. The Angora Independence Tribunal has also had before it the case of an Arab philanthropic association. I am not sure what association this is, and I hesitate to show any interest in it. It seems to have been suspected of being in touch with political societies, and the house of Emin Pasha, who was once, I believe, in command of the Dardanelles and now lives in Irak, was raided. But neither there nor otherwise does any evidence seem to have been found, and those who were arrested have now been released.

7. In other fields the Government has been equally ruthless. A week or so ago a simultaneous strike broke out among the telegraphists at Adana, Samsun and Trebizond. They were at once sent to the Angora Independence Tribunal, and it was said that they were acting at Communist instigation. This has since been denied, and it seems that they were merely suffering from gross overwork, underpay and neglect. However, whatever the result of the trial, it will doubtless be some time before any Government employees strike again.

8. The Independence Tribunal, which moved from Diarbekir to Urfa, has now gone on to the Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz, and thither half-a-dozen Constantinople journalists will be sent on for trial. They were arrested many weeks ago on the absurd charge that their barely expressed criticism of the Government had helped to promote the Kurdish rebellion. Meanwhile, their colleagues, who have been unmolested, are too terrified in any way to discuss internal politics.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4380/3822/44] No. 13.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 568.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 20, 1925.*

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 489 of the 22nd June, I have the honour to report that, according to an American missionary who has recently arrived from Mardin, the conditions under which the non-Moslem population of that place live have very much improved in the last year or two. They are almost entirely Syrian Jacobites, and their better relations with the authorities are due very largely to the tact of the Assyrian Patriarch, who lives at Mardin. They are under no disability in the matter of trade or of movement in the district, and are fairly prosperous. The Vali is a competent man, and treats them properly. The American missionaries, who are the only foreigners, are only allowed to communicate with the outside world in Turkish, but this seems to be a censorship measure due to the Kurdish rebellion.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4387/109/44] No. 14.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 575.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 21, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 555 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that I called on the French Ambassador yesterday with a view to ascertaining the results of his recent negotiations at Angora. His Excellency had not much to say on the subject beyond what I have already reported. His main impression appeared to be that it was impossible to try and hurry the Turks, who were intensely

suspicious and cautious in negotiation, because they realised the inferiority of their mental equipment and were consequently afraid of "giving themselves away." His present intention is not to return to Angora until October.

2. It will be seen that M. Sarraut has reconsidered his first intentions, as reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 436 of the 2nd June, either to achieve a prompt result or to return to France.

3. M. Sarraut then proceeded to discuss the state of Anglo-Turkish relations, saying that he had endeavoured to make the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs realise that Turkey had everything to gain and nothing to lose by placing her relations with Great Britain on a satisfactory footing. The Turks should understand that the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Near East had been entirely reconsidered within the last two years, and especially since you had taken charge of British foreign relations. It was perfectly evident from all that you had said and done that all your efforts were devoted to healing the wounds of the war. He said that he thought he had made some sort of impression, though of course the atmosphere of suspicion which he had already described was a great difficulty and, moreover, the Turks were obsessed by the question of Mosul.

4. M. Sarraut explained, speaking on the lines reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 440 of the 2nd June, that he had pressed Tewfik Rushdi Bey somewhat vigorously on this subject, because, as he told the latter, of Russian aggression in Asia. Tewfik Rushdi Bey replied that it was fully realised in Turkey that the old struggle between "the whale and the bear" was again engaged, and perhaps with greater intensity than ever before. Turkey was determined to maintain her independence and had no intention of being reduced to the state either of a mandated territory or to that of a federated Sovietic republic. He was greatly preoccupied by news of the spread of Bolshevism in Chinese Turkestan.

5. M. Sarraut then said that he wondered whether, whatever the decisions of the League of Nations regarding the Irak frontier, His Majesty's Government could not find means, after it had been announced, to make a spontaneous concession to Turkish aspirations; such a *geste* would have an enormous effect. I said that I did not know enough about the ethnographic and other considerations to have the slightest idea whether such a step would be even remotely possible and he replied that he was in the same position.

6. I then managed to bring the conversation back to his direct negotiations at Angora and he told me that he had tried and failed to induce Tewfik Rushdi Bey to discuss the question of the coupon with him; he had pointed out that the present régime in Turkey depended to an almost perilous extent on one man; that régime was living on its great achievements in driving out the Greeks and winning a satisfactory peace at Lausanne. The popularity thus acquired was evidently on the wane. The recent political trials and the forcible elimination of the opposition, which had been considered necessary, showed that this was the case. If, therefore, the Administration did not take early steps to improve the economic conditions of the country, a collapse, owing to public discontent, was to be foreseen. The only way any rapid improvement could be secured was by attracting foreign capital. Foreign capital could not be attracted unless the Turkish Government showed a desire to meet its creditors in a reasonable spirit. Tewfik Rushdi Bey had, however, refused to be drawn, saying that the negotiations would be conducted between the Turkish representatives in Paris and the representatives of the bondholders.

7. It is perhaps worth recording that a few weeks ago the German Ambassador talked to me on the subject of Anglo-Turkish relations in a strain very similar to M. Sarraut. He did not refer specifically to Mosul, but declared emphatically that "eine freundliche Geste" by us would produce a marked effect and would be to the general advantage. It is curious that the French and German Ambassadors should hold language quite similar to that used by the Turkish Ambassador at his first conversation with you as recorded in your despatch No. 638 of the 29th June.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4414 1601 44 No 15.

Mr Eyres to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received July 28)

(No)
Sir

Durazzo, July 18, 1

WITH reference to Mr Peel's despatch No of the 14th December, 1, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Treaty of Establishment which was made between Great Britain and Albania on the 9th instant, and which has now been ratified by both parties.

2. The Consular Convention has not been concluded, owing to the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Albanian delegation at Angora. The Albanian delegate, Mr Fuad Effendi, has been instructed to proceed to Angora, but Albania is at present unrepresented at Angora, and the Albanian Government is therefore unable to proceed with the negotiations.

3. Diplomatic relations have been established between the two countries, and I hear that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs has been appointed to Tirana, and that Turkish consuls will be appointed at Valona and Durazzo, but I have not yet been informed as to the Albanian appointments.

I have, &c.
H. C. A. EYRES

Enclosure No. 5

Traité d'Amitié entre l'Albanie et la République turque

L'ÉTAT albanais d'une part et la République turque d'autre part,

Désirant établir de bonnes relations entre les deux pays sur la base du respect des droits que la vie civilisée reconnaît à tous les peuples,

Mus par le désir réciproque de consolider les liens de sincère amitié qui unissent les deux nations,

Convaincus que l'établissement entre les deux États servira la prospérité et le bien-être de leurs citoyens respectifs,

Ont décidé de conclure un Traité d'Amitié et ont à cet effet nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

L'État albanais :

Jacoub Bey Frasheri, Président de la Chambre et de la Délégation albanaise,
Djafer Bey Vllahi, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères albanais,
Nezir Bey Leskovik, membre de la délégation albanaise.

La République turque :

Chukri Kaya Bey, Député de Mentcha à la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie,

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus bons et en bonne forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de résider et de circuler sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront en toute sécurité se livrer à leur commerce, conformément aux lois et règlements généraux dans tous les pays.

ARTICLE 2

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention ne visent pas et ne règlent pas la question de l'immigration et ne portent pas atteinte au droit dont chacune des parties contractantes dispose de restreindre ou d'interdire l'immigration sur son pays.

ARTICLE 3

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sur le territoire de l'autre tous les droits civils et garanties qui sont ou seront accordés à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne leurs personnes et leurs biens, et ils jouiront à cet égard de tous les droits et privilèges qui sont ou seront accordés aux nationaux, sous réserve de se conformer aux lois et règlements respectifs, et dans le respect des usages établis dans le pays.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de voyager librement sur le territoire de l'autre et d'y séjourner, et ils seront soumis, dans l'exercice de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne et leurs biens, droits et intérêts et pourront acquisition, possession, mutation ou héritage à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux que pourront être imposés aux nationaux

ARTICLE 3

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour conclure, à la date de ce jour, la Convention d'Établissement et un Arrangement concernant la Nationalité.

ARTICLE 4

Le présent traité sera ratifié et ses ratifications seront échangées à Angora aussitôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur dès que les ratifications auront été échangées.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Angora le

Convention d'Établissement entre l'Albanie et la Turquie

L'État albanais d'une part et la République turque d'autre part, animés du désir de consolider les liens d'amitié qui unissent les deux nations et de ressortissants de l'Albanie, et résolus de conclure à cet effet une convention, ont désigné à cet effet comme leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

L'État albanais :

Jacoub Bey Frasheri, Président de la Chambre et de la délégation albanaise,
Djafer Bey Vllahi, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères albanais,
Nezir Bey Leskovik, membre de la délégation albanaise.

La République turque :

Chukri Kaya Bey, Député de Mentcha à la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie,

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus bons et en bonne forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de résider et de circuler sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront en toute sécurité se livrer à leur commerce, conformément aux lois et règlements généraux dans tous les pays.

ARTICLE 2

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention ne visent pas et ne règlent pas la question de l'immigration et ne portent pas atteinte au droit dont chacune des parties contractantes dispose de restreindre ou d'interdire l'immigration sur son pays.

ARTICLE 3

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sur le territoire de l'autre tous les droits civils et garanties qui sont ou seront accordés à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne leurs personnes et leurs biens, et ils jouiront à cet égard de tous les droits et privilèges qui sont ou seront accordés aux nationaux, sous réserve de se conformer aux lois et règlements respectifs, et dans le respect des usages établis dans le pays (douanes, patentes, &c.).

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de voyager librement sur le territoire de l'autre et d'y séjourner, et ils seront soumis, dans l'exercice de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne et leurs biens, droits et intérêts et pourront acquisition, possession, mutation ou héritage à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux que pourront être imposés aux nationaux

Article 4

Dans le cas où [illegible] des parties contractantes soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les [illegible] règlements sur la police des étrangers, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la [illegible] soit pour des motifs d'ordre [illegible] l'État expulsera par mesure [illegible] les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, celle-ci s'engage à les recevoir, eux et leurs familles. Le transport jusqu'à la frontière des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie contractante expulsante.

Article 5

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sous condition de réciprocité sur le territoire de l'autre le droit d'acquérir de posséder et d'aliéner toute espèce de biens meubles et immeubles à l'exception des biens ruraux, et se conformant aux [illegible] règlements. Ils pourront disposer par acte de vente, échange, [illegible] testament [illegible] de tous les contrats de possession par voie de succession ab intestat ou testamentaire. Les successeurs [illegible] ressortissants auront [illegible] droits successifs [illegible] impôts successoraux [illegible] ou plus élevés que ceux [illegible] pour les nationaux.

Article 6

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront astreints sur le territoire de l'autre à aucun service militaire, soit dans l'armée de terre et de mer soit dans la gendarmerie ou la police rurale, ni à aucune [illegible] ou charge remplaçant le service militaire.

Ils sont [illegible] exceptés de toute réquisition militaire. Ils seront également exempts de toute contribution personnelle de guerre pour les biens [illegible] qui ne serait pas imposée également aux nationaux.

Article 7

Les sociétés commerciales et industrielles constituées [illegible] sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui sont constituées conformément aux lois de celle-ci pourront exercer également comme telles leurs droits sur le territoire de l'autre tant en justice qu'en dehors, et jouiront de l'existence légale sous la condition toutefois qu'elles remplissent les formalités prescrites par les lois et règlements du pays. Elles auront à condition de réciprocité le droit de s'établir et de commercer librement sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante, se conformant aux lois et règlements du pays.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres commerciales ou industrielles, de [illegible] des parties contractantes pourront, dans aucun cas être soumises pour l'exercice du commerce et de l'industrie sur le territoire de l'autre, à des droits, taxes, impôts ou charges sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront exigés des sociétés nationales.

Il est toutefois entendu que l'exception prévue au premier paragraphe de l'article 5 s'applique également aux biens immobiliers que pourront acquérir les sociétés visées au paragraphe précédent.

Article 8

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront, sur le territoire de l'autre, être expropriés que pour [illegible] utilité publique, même temporairement, de la jouissance de leurs biens que pour cause légalement reconnue d'utilité publique et contre remboursement de la valeur.

Article 9

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront sur le territoire de l'autre en tout ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leur personne et de leurs biens du même traitement que les nationaux.

Article 10

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée de deux ans. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de cette période de deux ans, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, en cas de dénonciation, cette dénonciation aura [illegible] ses effets [illegible] après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

La présente convention sera ratifiée [illegible] et les ratifications seront échangées à Angora aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Fait en double à Angora le

Arrangement concernant la Nationalité

Article 1er

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais et domiciliées sur le territoire dudit État au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du présent arrangement deviendront sujets de l'État albanais.

Article 2

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais et domiciliées à l'étranger au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du présent arrangement deviendront sujets [illegible].

Article 3.

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais âgées de plus de 18 ans mariées ou non, qui [illegible] déclaration écrite à faire [illegible] le présent arrangement [illegible] pour opter en faveur de la nationalité albanaise.

Les personnes qui [illegible] voudront opter pour la nationalité albanaise devront dans l'année qui suivra [illegible] de cet arrangement se dessaisir de tous leurs biens immobiliers et immeubles acquis [illegible] et [illegible] compris tous leurs rapports et quitter la Turquie à condition [illegible] le plus court.

Il est toutefois entendu que ces personnes seront considérées comme sujets turcs jusqu'au moment où elles auront [illegible] opté.

Article 4

Les Turcs âgés de plus de 18 ans, domiciliés sur le territoire de l'État albanais et qui conformément aux dispositions du présent arrangement auront acquis la nationalité albanaise auront dans l'année à dater de l'entrée en vigueur de cet arrangement la faculté de réintégrer la nationalité turque [illegible] et seront soumis aux dispositions de l'article 3.

Article 5

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais de toute race restant en Turquie, garderont la nationalité turque ainsi que les personnes originaires de la Turquie, conserveront tous leurs biens et propriétés se trouvant en Albanie. Les mêmes, ceux ayant la nationalité albanaise garderont tous leurs biens et propriétés en Turquie.

Article 6

Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de 18 ans suivront la condition de leurs parents. [illegible] [illegible] l'application des dispositions des articles précédents.

Article 7

Les ressortissants des territoires de l'État albanais qui, à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent arrangement, garderont la nationalité turque se trouvant sur les territoires turcs et albanais seront libres d'opter en faveur de la nationalité albanaise, en remettant aux autorités consulaires turques [illegible] de leur option dans les six mois à partir de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

[E 4708 1091 44] No 16.

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 602)

Sir, *Therapia, August 3, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a meeting of a rather unusual character was held in the building of the Grand National Assembly at Angora on the 27th ultimo, to which all Deputies belonging to the People's party and then at Angora were summoned by urgent letter. The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and eight Ministers as well as Angora attended the meeting, which lasted the whole afternoon. Ali Saib Bey, Deputy for Kozan and a member of the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces and Feizi Bey, Deputy for Diarbekr, who was Minister of Public Works in Fethi Bey's Government which preceded the present Government, were among those present. As the Grand National Assembly is now having its long vacation, and no one will live in Angora during this season who can avoid doing so, the number of persons attending the meeting was comparatively small.

2. According to the reports which have reached Constantinople, the meeting discussed in general the line to be followed by the tribunal in dealing with feudalism," and in particular an incident which had arisen out of evidence given before the Tribunal of Independence during a sitting at Diarbekr on the 22nd June last.

3. The following is a short account of the incident referred to. Koghuli Hassan, one of the persons accused of participation in the Kurdish rebellion, who is brought before the Tribunal of Independence and questioned by Ali Saib Bey, declared that the Bey had had a conversation with a villager of the Diarbekr region and, in answer to questions respecting the new republican regime, he stated that religion had been separated from the State and that the Ghazi Pasha did not pay. But let us spare other questions of Ali Saib Bey were calculated to elicit information showing that Feizi Bey was a party to the rebellion. Feizi Bey assisted in defence of these delegates on the 21st June last, and these matters rested for a month during which time the Government were presumably debating whether or not to bring Feizi Bey to trial. Apparently it was decided that as he is a native of Diarbekr, a more effective course would be to provide him with a suitable and solemn occasion to make a public profession of loyalty in order to show that the Deputy for Diarbekr has no sympathy with the ideas which prompted the Kurdish insurrection. He was accordingly invited to address the meeting and in a long speech he duly repented of his denial and expressed his respect for the President of the Republic and Ismet Pasha.

4. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the situation in the eastern vilayets and is reported to have taken a unanimous decision to extirpate the remnants of feudalism in those parts.

5. The "Vakit" of the 24th July and the "Akshan" of the 20th July devoted their leading articles to this subject. The former stated that if the Government made it clear that there did not exist and could not exist any power in this country other than national justice "feudalism" would be eliminated beyond repair, while the latter pointed out that the beys, aghas and sheikhs were not only superfluous but were disturbing factors in the social system. It would be an easy matter to get rid of them, the Turkish revolution having already abolished more important relics of the past which the people had congratulated the Government on its decision.

6. In this connection I would mention that Jemil Bey, Minister of the Interior, who left Angora in the first week in July accompanied by Refik Bey, Minister of Public Health, on a tour of the eastern vilayets, held a conference at Diarbekr on the 17th July with the valis of the region, Zeki Bey, Commandant of the gendarmerie and Arif Bey, civil inspector, who was studying the most appropriate manner of carrying out the reforms for administrative purposes. Jemil Bey returned to Angora on the 21st instant, and his views will no doubt carry weight when the measures to be introduced in the eastern vilayets which Ismet Pasha foreshadowed in his speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 7th April last are decided upon. (Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 283 of the 8th April last.)

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4704 3831 44] No 17

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 605.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 4, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Aeroplane Association, which was founded four or five months ago, has been very active recently in collecting subscriptions for the purchase of aeroplanes and other purposes connected with the development of aviation in this country.

2. The president of the association is Jevad Abbas Bey, who sits as Deputy for Bolu in the Grand National Assembly. He is at present making a tour of aeroplane factories in Europe with a view to purchasing a number of planes for the association. Although not a department of the Government the Aeroplane Association enjoys the full support of the Government. Ministers occasionally preside at its meetings and many of its members are Government officials or officers of the army and navy. Its activities recall the activities of the Navy Association during the years preceding the great war, particularly in the methods employed to collect subscriptions. Pressures, when necessary, exercised on persons with fixed incomes to bring them to contribute a definite proportion to the association. Merchants are trading concerns are assessed and fairly made to contribute in accordance with their supposed means. Propaganda is unceasing even among the poorer classes of the population, and subscriptions are said to be accepted. The association has speakers throughout the country and the press contains almost daily references to these missions addressed by receipts towns and villages. A sum of £T 2,000 has already been subscribed, and Jevad Abbas Bey stated publicly a few weeks ago that the association was confident of receiving a total of £T 6,000 before the end of the year.

3. In the years 1912-14 it was frequently stated that the object of the Navy Association was to replace "Dreadnoughts" as a menace to Greece. At the present time there is no reason to suppose that the activities of the Aeroplane Association are within the limits indicated in the last paragraph of Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 30 of the 4th April last.

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 5025/109/44] No. 8

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 634.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 17, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 602 of the 28th April last, His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna forwarded to you copies of the notes which the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of the withdrawal of foreign representatives at Angora.

2. I have now obtained from these Ambassadors copies of the reply which they have received, two of which I have the honour to transmit copies herewith.

3. The reply to Sir R. Lindsay's note was described in my despatch No. 547 of the 14th July.

I have &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8

Note Remise par M. Nouret Bey

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Angora, le 6 juillet 1925.*

EN réponse à la note du 24 avril 1925, remise par M. Jesse à Nouret Bey, celui-ci a l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie a toujours reconnu au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie le droit d'établir auprès du Gouvernement de la République turque des missions diplomatiques étrangères, les terrains pour la construction de leur Ambassade ou Légation et que le choix définitif de ces terrains serait soumis à l'examen du Gouvernement turc.

Le Gouvernement turc a été très heureux de recevoir ces assurances relatives au désir qu'a le Gouvernement italien de maintenir et développer les

relations avec le Gouvernement turc. C'est précisément parce qu'il est animé du même esprit que le Gouvernement de la République ne voudrait voir le Corps diplomatique s'installer plus tôt possible dans la capitale de la Turquie.

Mon Gouvernement n'a naturellement pas songé à restreindre, comme semble le croire le Gouvernement français, la liberté de résidence et de mouvement des représentants étrangers. Il a seulement voulu rappeler que la capitale de Turquie est à Angora et que les facilités actuellement accordées par suite des nécessités matérielles du moment ne sauraient se manifester que par une délégation du même département à Constantinople pour les affaires courantes.

Mon Gouvernement ne peut pas, également, accepter la parallélisme entre la situation du Gouvernement français, qui reste provisoirement à Versailles et celle du Gouvernement de la République turque.

En outre, Constantinople ne peut pas être considérée comme une capitale qui n'a pas été jusqu'à présent appelée à porter la phrase de la note susvisée de M. Jusserand relative aux États retenant le même agent diplomatique auprès de tous les pays qui restent dans un seul [illegible].

Cet usage est l'usage de tous les pays qui, en fait, ne maintiennent auprès de leur Ambassade ou Légation auprès des affaires courantes en contact avec le Ministère des Affaires étrangères et font bénéficier de la sorte à la solution de tous les points soulevés par la note susvisée de M. Jusserand et toute autre question qui pourrait surgir. Il va sans dire que cette solution pourrait naturellement être différée jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement français ait décidé de quelle manière il entend organiser son service diplomatique auprès du Gouvernement de la République turque.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

NOUSRET

Enclosure 2 in No. 18

Note de M. Mantoux.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 12 juillet 1925.*

J'ai reçu sous la date du 10 avril 1925 la note de votre Excellence par laquelle elle a bien voulu me faire connaître que le Gouvernement de la République turque a affecté les termes suivants les [illegible] étrangères auprès desquelles sera accrédité son Ambassadeur et Légation sera établie par le Gouvernement national de Turquie et que pour les autres pays les termes seront [illegible] ces sujets.

Mon Gouvernement n'a pas songé à demander dans la note dont parle votre Excellence un engagement de cette nature, qui n'a pas d'analogue dans les relations diplomatiques étrangères. Il se borne à prendre acte de la déclaration de la Turquie, à savoir que la capitale de la République turque est Angora et que les facilités actuellement accordées à Constantinople ne sauraient être considérées comme affectant en rien le statut de cette ville.

Mon Gouvernement constate également que c'est possédant pour tous les pays, y compris la Turquie, comme Ambassade ou Légation auprès des affaires courantes, que [illegible] compte au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République turque la solution de la question de savoir si l'Ambassadeur nommé auprès de la Sublime Porte peut, dès à présent, être considéré comme accrédité auprès du Gouvernement de la République même s'il doit résider provisoirement à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement de la République a été heureux des assurances que votre Excellence a bien voulu lui donner au sujet de la déclaration faite par le Gouvernement turc à l'Assemblée générale de la Société des Nations relative aux relations entre les deux pays. Il accueille avec satisfaction cette déclaration et pense, comme le Gouvernement turc, que la divergence de vues entre les deux pays ne saurait affecter les relations amicales existant entre les deux pays.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

M. NOUSRET

E 5029/194/44. No. 19

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received August 24.*)

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 17, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 633 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the Angora Tribunal of Independence has now finished the trial of seventeen persons on charges relating to their activities in connection with the Terakkiat Selbiye and directed against the republic. The President of the tribunal, who had read in court, referred at length to the objects of the "Terakkiat Selbiye" and emphasised the fact that only offences and acts of treason committed subsequently to the coming into force of the Declaration of Amnesty annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne had been taken into consideration. A letter addressed to the court by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, stating that he renounced his right to use Lutfi Fikri Bey personally was also read and this body of "magnanimity" was greeted with fury by the entire press. Under article 1 of Lutfi Fikri Bey, thirty-five of the accused were acquitted, the trial of Muzaffer Bey, who is pursuing at Lagos Mustafa Kemal's activity against Turkey" was transferred to the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces. Mustafa Bey, ex-Deputy for the Yemen, was convicted of his Turkish nationality and banished, seven of the accused were condemned to imprisonment for [illegible] years' prison and seven were condemned to [illegible] years and six to be hanged. It was further decided by the tribunal that "the assassins of the late Dr. Reshid Pasha should be tried separately."

2. Twenty-seven persons condemned to death were promptly hanged on the morning of the 16th instant in a garden opposite the building which was formerly used as the meeting place of the Grand National Assembly and now serves as the headquarters of the Progressist party. Among them were Kemal Bey, ex-Director of the Municipality of Yozgad, Ismail Bey, ex-Commandant of Kirazlidemir, Hussein Pasha, ex-Director of Chemicals, and Nuri Effendi, Osman Daver, writers of the extremist newspaper "Hyssiet."

3. During the past week the Angora Tribunal also concluded the trial of some twenty persons charged with Communist propaganda. Three of the accused were acquitted, the others being sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from seven months to fifteen years. Seventeen persons with the exception of Dr. Sadyk Bey, who was declared notoriously by the public ministry to be guilty, were acquitted. The list of May 1 [illegible] among the workers at Tavshantepe. It was stated that [illegible] years imprisonment only [illegible].

4. The Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces has during the past week [illegible] Kemal Bey, Abdul-Kadir Kemaly and Vehid Beys were executed. The accounts of the proceedings were [illegible] the press were merely [illegible] that [illegible] and that [illegible] of responsibility for the Kurdish risings [illegible] Vehid Bey [illegible] Sheikh Said's [illegible] No. 386 of 1925.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

No. 20.

Sir E. Drummond to Sir H. Lytton. — *Received August 31.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, *Geneva, August 31, 1925.*

I HAVE received the following telegram from the Acting Foreign Minister:—

"Mouvements sismiques depuis 23-24 août dans mes [illegible] et proximité côtes turques ont une signification qui ne peut pas être méconnue à un haut degré. En effet, mouvements ont opéré de 23-24 août après-midi. Vendredi 24-25 instants ce grand tremblement de terre s'est [illegible] Mytilène et [illegible] dirige leurs propres sur [illegible] Dikili, Soma, Sakh et Chio. Samedi 25 août, les coups de [illegible] ininterrompus, mais [illegible] à l'entrée des Dardanelles et le même jour cinq navires venant directement de Londres, [illegible] Salonique [illegible] entrée anglaise venant [illegible] le 24-25 août [illegible] Smyrne [illegible]

port Kara Bereun et a exercé des exercices dans ces parages et s'avançant vers port Smyrne a jugé ses procédures sur les fortifications environs de Tchesmé Mytilène et Nadjiler et ces entreprises règles droit international en abordant locales fortifiées zones interdites par Turquie Torpilleurs Britanniques arrivés avec notre permission pour débarquer dans presqu'île Gallipoli sollicitent rendre visiter lieux sépultures interrogent navires comme se conversant aux forces sur leurs lieux départ et destinations Telles circonstances et dires semblent avec notre télégramme 26 août soit relatif exhibition bleu ouvert mer de Bruxelles 24 août marin démontrent clairement désir Gouvernement britannique faire pression sur Session Conseil Société Nations pour mettre question Mossoul Et vue Britannique voir ouverture discussion premier paragraphe article 13 Traité Lausanne établissant responsabilité Turquie mauvaise application article 16 même traité concernant Régime Détroits interdit établissement zones interdites pour concentration matériel guerre Veuillez entretenir Conseil

It would be desirable that communiqué issued regarding the Council meeting should suggest that the British Government was not content to inform the Council with the least possible delay

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[E 5221 32 65 No. 1

Consul De Lotbinière to Austen Chamberlain (received September 1)

Ambassade de la République française à Londres
31 août 1927

Monsieur le Ministre

SUR les instructions que mon Gouvernement vient de me donner, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance et à votre bienveillante attention les faits suivants

1. Un croiseur turc a été aperçu, le 24 courant, à proximité de l'île de Vrokh. Le 24 et le 25 août, deux navires de guerre britanniques devant Mytilène auraient échangé des signaux avec des navires de Dardanelles. Samedi soir, 26 courant, le Conseil de l'Amirauté britannique aurait donné l'ordre à tous les bâtiments de la flotte de la Méditerranée orientale de se tenir prêts à appareiller dans les vingt-quatre heures et de se rendre sans retard dans les eaux de Smyrne.

2. Le 27 courant, un autre croiseur britannique aurait pénétré dans le golfe de Kara Bournou et aurait effectué des exercices de débarquement dans les parages de Kara Bournou et de Kara Bournou.

3. Les torpilleurs britanniques qui auraient pénétré dans les eaux territoriales turques auraient demandé à visiter les côtes afin de faire des photographies des fortifications et auraient interrogé les navires qu'ils auraient rencontrés sur leur route.

Ces renseignements me paraissent comporter des indications fortuites, et je me suis empressé de prier le Gouvernement de la République de bien vouloir donner à ses représentants à Constantinople et à Angora des instructions de nature à éviter que de pareils incidents se renouvellent. Sa Majesté le Roi a également chargé son Ambassadeur à Constantinople de faire des démarches auprès du Gouvernement turc.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Veuillez agréer &c.,
A. DE LALD

No. 22

Mr. H. Henry to Consul London (General)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1927.*

FOLLOWING for Under Secretary of State

Delegation's telegram of 31st August (Turkish complaints against activities of British fleet) received this morning by telephone from Paris.

Movements of Mediterranean fleet in Ægean are merely part of normal summer exercises, which ordinarily include this area.

Use of demilitarised ports in connection with such exercises can in no sense be regarded as establishment of naval base or use as base for operations against Turkey or concentration against Turkey as prohibited by Lausanne settlement.

Secret orders are issued by all vessels [illegible] exercises must be carefully avoided during instances of air directions. They can of course be used effectively at ranges exceeding 2 miles, and distance at present close appears to have been at least 10 miles.

The only suggestion that firing practice referred to took place within Turkish territorial limits, and Turkish complaint is not therefore understood.

Telegraphic enquiries are being made regarding alleged [illegible] gas and at Sedul Bahr and at Smyrna. Turkish complaint regarding latter has appeared in today's Times.

The normal practice of British men-of-war visiting Turkish ports and vessels at anchor in Smyrna at exercise of signals which form no part of exercises or enquiries en route.

We cannot but suppose that Turkish delegation's acceptance of [illegible] has been taken in view of forthcoming meeting.

No. 23.

Consul London to Mr. H. Henry. Received September 2.

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) *Geneva, September 2, 1927.*

YOUR telegram No. 179.

Following from Cadogan.

Can I be stated officially that which British squadrons appear to be: Arvalo coast 23rd August, 24th August and ports of Kara Burnou and Smyrna 24th August, 25th August, territorial waters were not entered. What is there to [illegible] with the shore at Mytilene 24th August, 25th August and what nature?

[E 5221 32 65 No. 24

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Ahmed Fethi Bey.

Your Excellency *Foreign Office, September 2, 1927.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 31st August, communicating certain complaints put forward by the Turkish Government in regard to the movements and activities of the British Mediterranean fleet in the Ægean Sea.

2. In reply I beg leave to inform your Excellency that the movements of His Majesty's fleet in the Ægean Sea are part of the normal summer exercises of the fleet which take place every year and which remain in no way [illegible] this year.

3. His Majesty's Government do not appear to understand the reference in the second paragraph of your note to the [illegible] by His Majesty's ships of certain zones to certain events of the previous month, as no such zones have been established by the British naval authorities in Turkish territorial waters.

4. As regards the [illegible] signals by His Majesty's ships off the Turkish coast, I would explain that such lights are normally [illegible] by ships of war

during exercises also are naturally visible at long distances in all directions. They cannot, however, be used effectively at a range exceeding 2 miles, and the vessels whose lights are stated to have been seen from the Turkish coast will appear in the cases referred to to have been lying at a distance of at least 10 miles from the latter.

5. Your note makes no mention of the exact position of the vessels from which firing appears to have been heard. Firing practices, of course, form a normal and necessary part of the exercises, and the speed of ships would inevitably carry a considerable distance. In the absence of any evidence to show what the firing practice referred to took place at, Turkish waters it is difficult to say what grounds of complaint the Turkish Government may eventually put forward, if any.

6. As regards the statement that British representatives have ordered merchant vessels at the port of the Dardanelles to leave except at the risk of their being fired on by a British man-of-war, I am to state that no such order has been issued. The exercise of signals referred to consists in the formation of a target by the fleet, which is then fired on by the fleet as to the range of which the vessels are left to judge.

7. Telegraphic enquiries are being addressed to the commanders-in-chief of the Mediterranean squadrons, and I am to inform you that Sir Austen Chamberlain will be glad to receive any further complaints which British subjects may desire to make in this matter.

8. In view of the foregoing, Lord Cushendun trusts that you will realise that the complaints of the Turkish Government are based on a complete misapprehension of the facts, which were matters of routine and which had not the slightest connection with the impending discussions at Geneva.

I have &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 25

Sir R. Lindsay (No. 2 to Constantinople). (Received at Foreign Office, Received September 4.)

(No. 114.)

Telegraphic. *Constantinople, September 4, 1925.*

FOR THE RIGHT HON. MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

According to press, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is complaining about British naval manœuvres in the Levant. Following is all that has happened:

1. Mediterranean fleet is making cruise in Ægean, touching at progressively smaller ports.

2. Two cruisers passed through the Straits 29th August and visited Varna, Constanza, and Odessa.

3. Visits of ships are not considered to be known to foreign powers, but the last two have been completely arranged with the Turkish authorities since 12th September.

Inspecting Minister for Foreign Affairs left Constantinople 23rd August, expecting to be back in two days' time, but has not returned. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me that he was not in a position to say when Minister would return, as he had not received any instructions. Minister for Foreign Affairs left with the impression that the Angora visit was not to be interrupted.

Inspecting officers are very unfavourably impressed with the Turkish military authorities, who, they say, are hopelessly inefficient in the way of training, discipline, and leadership.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 5375/194/44 No. 26

Mr. Ramsay Muir to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received September 5.)

No. 222.

Sir, *Liverpool, September 1, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum containing observations on a recent report on the situation in Turkey at present, which I have received from Professor Arnold Toynbee, who has recently visited Turkey for the purpose of making a study of the present situation there. I have myself had the opportunity of discussing the matter with Professor Toynbee, and I am convinced that the views which he has formed are based on a careful and impartial study of the facts, and are entitled to the most serious consideration.

I have, &c.
RAMSAY MUIR.

[illegible] Working Party was [illegible] and I have not only not taken [illegible] but have specifically stated that I [illegible] A. Loss. Kazim Karabekir's Retirement. Reports [illegible] are almost forgotten. If they [illegible] they [illegible] the Executive are [illegible] critics of [illegible] party [illegible] part [illegible] to the body of the State. Party [illegible] the press [illegible] and [illegible] only the Central [illegible] Hakki Pasha [illegible] Mustafa Kemal at Angora [illegible] Constantinople. We [illegible] the 20th August [illegible] Government [illegible] Republic [illegible] right to all foreign [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] made use of the Imperial Ottoman [illegible] goes well [illegible] Sultanate [illegible] Government [illegible] Angora [illegible] Caliphate [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Western [illegible] Turkey [illegible] important events [illegible] and [illegible] expect.

I hoped the Government [illegible] determined to maintain the present regime of repression [illegible] to suit [illegible] Friends of Liberty [illegible] to [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] through [illegible] new [illegible] as [illegible] Angora [illegible] to [illegible] and the [illegible] Government towards [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] the [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Angora [illegible] Caliphate [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Angora [illegible] Caliphate [illegible] Constantinople [illegible] Angora [illegible] Caliphate [illegible] Constantinople

E 5376 58 44] No 27

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received September 8)

(No DOT A[illegible]
Sir *The Hague September 2, 1925*

IN connection with my telegram No 113 of the 29th ultimo relative to the closing of the Constantinople Bourse I have the honour to inform you that this measure was applied on Saturday morning the 29th August on the instructions of the Minister of Finance the following being a translation of the notification posted outside the Bourse

'As certain persons have speculated to the serious prejudice of the country on the Constantinople Bourse, I have decided in pursuance of the power given to me by Article 11 of the Law of the 29th September 1340 that the Bourse shall be closed

'I call upon the public Masters of Ceremonies [illegible] to refer to Article 11 of the Law of the 29th September 1340 in order to inform the public that the Bourse is closed by order of the Government and that speculators on the Bourse will be severely punished'

The effect of this step will be to drive the Bourse business underground and to encourage [illegible] transactions

The Bourse was closed within three days of what would appear to be the most favourable possible circumstances for the introduction of the Turkish currency reform, which, as you will remember, was introduced on the 1st instant, and the secret manœuvres of speculators to depress the value of the new currency in order to make a profit on the transaction are now frustrated

Other banks and exchange offices are now being opened in Constantinople

The Ministry of Finance is said to have given yesterday a promise to the Bourse that the question of the re-opening of the Bourse will be considered within a week from the date of its closing

It is generally assumed that the immediate cause of the closing of the Bourse is the fear of the effect which the fall in the value of the Turkish pound in terms of gold may have on the Turkish Government's budget for the year

Whatever the motive, the Government is showing a lamentable disregard for the economic welfare

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

E 5527,4706 44] No 28

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain Received September 14)

(No 694)
Sir *The Hague September 9 1925*

I MENTIONED in my despatch No 578 of the 1st instant that in his speech at Utrecht the President of the Royal Academies according the use of frontier dress, had infringed [illegible] rights. Devastating [illegible] Hadji Adil Bey returned to Angora with a Council of Ministers at which the President, and three Cabinet Ministers were present and by which decrees were issued which [illegible] property confiscated to the State and the dress of the clergy and [illegible] as regulated I have had careful translations made of these important decrees, and I enclose them herewith *

2 The first observation that arises on reading these decrees which they recite certain reasons for the action taken, but no detailed text of any law on which it is based and I am not able to see which article of the Constitution arises the conduct of Ministers will not be [illegible] by the assembly to give such a reading [illegible] as the assumption of religious powers and the disposal of their property [illegible] have not taken place before the present [illegible] and [illegible] any person or political party [illegible] use to apply against the word the Ghazi has assigned him

3 I enclose [illegible] who Mustafa Kemal Pasha has at Konia [illegible] reported to [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] gangs of the wilder portions of Medley, [illegible] divisions between Konia and Mudania [illegible] the Ghazi left the capital [illegible] to see such gangs is perfectly [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] and only [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

E 5675 32 65 No 29

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain—(Received September 21)

(No 704)

Sir, *Therapia, September 14, 1925*

IN my telegram No 682 of this date I stated regarding the Turkish frontier question, I feel that it would be helpful if I were to report to you at length the views which Ismet Pasha expressed to me during the course of the long conversation which he had with me this morning. I do so in the hope that you may find in them some indication as to the line which it would be most profitable for His Majesty's Government to take at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

2. Ismet began by saying that he was glad to have had an opportunity of discussing matters with me before the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, as he was sure that we should be able to arrive at a friendly settlement of the question. He then proceeded to explain the Turkish point of view in detail. He said that the Turkish Government had always been willing to refer the question to the League of Nations, and had in fact done so on the occasion of the Lausanne Conference. They had, however, been obliged to withdraw from this position owing to the attitude adopted by the British Government, who had refused to allow the question to be discussed at Lausanne. The Turkish Government had then made a direct offer to His Majesty's Government to refer the question to the League of Nations, but this offer had been refused. The Turkish Government had then made a further offer to refer the question to the Council of the League of Nations, but this offer had been refused on the ground that the Council of the League of Nations was not competent to deal with the question. The Turkish Government had then made a further offer to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, but this offer had been refused on the ground that the Permanent Court of International Justice was not competent to deal with the question

4. It is true that the resistance of the Southern Kurds disquiets the Turkish authorities whatever they may say to the contrary more than anything else, and as the Turks must, however, still desire to become a prosperous and orderly region with which they may trade it now chosen British officers the Turks cannot long delay the effect of their own discontented Kurdish tribes. So long as His Majesty's Government are resolved to give authority to the Kurds of Iraq, there will have come into existence in His Majesty's Government and the Turks certainly would by no means welcome the Turkish frontier. I have always assumed this as a pledges.

These considerations and the actual measure of our policy not to mention an obligation to the League might impose must make it impossible for us to make any cession to Turkey in this direction.

You will clearly appreciate that the whole tendency of the modern Turkish State is towards Pan-Turkism and secular reform and owing to the harshness practised in these things with which the Turks regard these aims there is much that is to make the sympathy of those who desire Turkey to become a strong and prosperous State. Under the most favourable possible circumstances there may well be just cause that the Turks would be justified in resisting perhaps with force resisting their Kurds to the utmost of their power and possess no strong moral sanction of their own. Yet the Turkish authorities respect difficult to the point of view of the existing population and adds to their. What therefore we to say of a proposal to the Assembly who are now a native nature of their language and literature to be regarded as their own?

5. I have expressed the view that the Turkish Government would be induced to accept the loss of Mosul if the League should decide that it belongs to Iraq. I do not believe that the Turks would risk a rupture with Great Britain. Most anxious to complete the reforms which they have undertaken, the Kemalists would first investigations. I believe that the Turkish public opinion would resist themselves with the utmost. He entered with W.O. Turkish would not the vote he thought to be the case. He [illegible] the Lausanne Treaty and His Majesty's Government might fail to [illegible] rupturing the [illegible] with the south of the river. Still, last night's [illegible] figure [illegible] of [illegible] Interpellations. It [illegible] Mosul [illegible] to Arab [illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible] Turks will either exist themselves, [illegible] [illegible] how will [illegible] the [illegible] themselves [illegible] converted [illegible] by the Arabs.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 5687/194/44 No. 31

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received September 21)

(No. 717)
Sir, *Therapia, September 16, 1925*

THERE have been signs in the last few days that the Turkish Government is somewhat increasing the severity of its repressive policy.

2. Firstly, the journalists who were put on trial before the Independence Tribunal of the Last for having by their writings encouraged the Kurdish rebellion (see Mr. Hall's despatch No. 623 of the 11th August last) have with one exception been acquitted. The exception is the editor of the Anadolu Tok Sözü, who has been sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. As the other journalists it transpires that in the early days of their trial fear of their readers to engage in the Press Law appeal amounting almost to a confession. With exception of the Ghazi they protested the purity of their republicanism and of their devotion to the Government they admitted the misguided nature of their writings and protested that if they had realised the truth at the time they would not have so written they declare their intention of abandoning journalism. This telegram nevertheless, had no effect and the trial proceeded for several days during which

the accused were questioned and cross-questioned as to their thoughts and writings in the usual manner. Just as the trial was drawing to a close, the journalists despatched a second telegram to the Ghazi signed by all ten of them. It is much shorter and contains far less in the way of admission than the first telegram, and indeed in some respects runs counter to it. The signatories declare themselves without exception the servants of the republic, they appeal to the President's rights and generosity in order that with vigilance and [illegible] intentions, they may resume their duties, and finally protest that the acquittal that is expected to [illegible] while imperfect will mean his Excellency's grace and favour. The second telegram was pronounced forthwith.

3. Now far the most interesting of these ten journalists is Velid Bunyadzade, editor of the suppressed Tewhid-i-Efkiar, the former Conservative Islamist paper. It was at their fellow-journalist's instance that on the 21st instant counsel may be remembered that in January 1921 when Yunus Nadi was in process of expulsion Celal [illegible] summoned all the editors of anti-Government Smyrna. Velid alone was excused "he of sect" to ask to be excused. Velid signed the second telegram to the Ghazi above. I did not see the first. I would suggest that the Government to [illegible] the [illegible] journalists [illegible] that [illegible] having first secured [illegible] mentality. The first telegram was [illegible] because Velid's signature was missing. In the second Velid's name was [illegible] and he [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. 33

Lord Kilmarnock to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received September 25.*)

No. 146. Confidential.

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, September 24, 1925.

GREEK Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me to-day. He said that at Geneva Dr. Nansen had informed Sir Eric Drummond that, while the Greek Government were prepared to co-operate in any scheme for the settlement of refugees in Asia Minor, they were opposed to the proposal that the Greek and Turkish Governments should enter into direct negotiations with each other. The Greek Government were, however, willing to enter into negotiations with the Angora Government through the League of Nations, and they would be glad to know whether the latter Government would be prepared to do so.

2. I said that I was sure that His Majesty's Government would welcome any proposal which would lead to the settlement of the refugee question, but that I could not say whether the Angora Government would be prepared to enter into negotiations with the League of Nations. I would, however, inquire.

3. His Excellency then asked me to inquire whether we were confident that the Angora Government would carry out the Lausanne Treaty. I said that I could not say that we were confident, but that we had no reason to suppose that they would not do so.

4. His Excellency then asked me to inquire whether we were confident that the Angora Government would maintain the present peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey. I said that I could not say that we were confident, but that we had no reason to suppose that they would not do so.

5. His Excellency then asked me to inquire whether we were confident that the Angora Government would maintain the present peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey. I said that I could not say that we were confident, but that we had no reason to suppose that they would not do so.

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Enclosure in No 37

Extract from Consular Visit to Angora, September 10–17 1925

Interpreting — Owing to the illness of Mr Bey who did not go to Geneva for the Red Cross Conference although he was elected to do so It is expected that he will give up his present post at the end of the year He left Angora at the interval to take a rest Yussuf Hikmet Bey has been succeeded as Director of Political Affairs by Nusret Saadullah Bey who during Turkish Ministership at The Hague He is stated to be very pleasant to deal with and Mr Bey is said to be friendly to Britain He was most courteous to the Caliph before the latter's departure He is a tall man with good manners and speaks English well

Cabinet — Nothing apparently is known about the struggle for offices between Mustafa Kemal's and Ismet Pasha's Secretary group The cabinet elected by Ismet Pasha Rustu Bey's strong hand in Constantinople is said to be a weak one and the struggle is believed to be still going on although Ismet Pasha is said to be the stronger of the two and to be making every effort to effect a reconciliation between the two parties The Hamit Ismet Stoli very popular Ismet Bey Interior has been given charge of the Salt Administration Fevzi Bey Commerce is said to be ill

The Declaration of the Entente — Mustafa Kemal presented a sash to the lady who threw flowers at the departing Pasha's saw her off at the station and Mme Ismet Pasha accompanied Mme Sevkia The Grand Vizier seems to be more powerful than ever and to be quite Human and not at all conceited or persistent He is on the most friendly terms with every Cabinet meeting is to be held next week when the Ismet Stoli is to be referred to the Cabinet It is stated that a Commercial Treaty with Britain is to be concluded and that the Grand Vizier has promised that he intends to visit Britain in the Autumn of 1926 if the Assembly agrees but that he intends to devote his whole time to his model farm at Esti as he is very fond of agriculture and he considers that by setting the best example to the farmers in the Country he can do more for the prosperity of Turkey than by any other means

Mood of People — In Constantinople we heard that Angora is full of Nationalist propaganda and that reactionary elements are in control Mr Frost the Vice Consul there says that there is no sign of any reaction in favour of the Sultanate

Commerce — According to Mr Frost Trade is expected this year to be higher than it was in 1924 It is confined to the Caravan routes and to the Railway Stations Building is going on at the Railway Stations and Angora and Caravan Stations are receiving attention by the Vali

Railway Extension — Nothing appears to be doing at present in Angora although the Vali hopes that the work will be resumed at least Angora was the Capital of Asia Minor in the 13th century and has many interesting old buildings and ruins The Vali is also the owner of a large collection of Roman and Byzantine coins which he showed me and which he is said to be willing to sell

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Railway — The permanent way has been relaid in many parts particularly between Angora and Yesilhisar and the bridges is nearing completion Two large wagons have recently arrived I returned to Angora and found

that many of the old ones have suffered from their two months stay at Angora and gauging room by experience on the way of the new ones has to be restricted They are gradually to be transferred to the Eastern Area which a few wagons only are already running All the new wagons that I saw were crowded

Hotels — The large new hotels are not yet made very little progress since I saw them in March last nor is it apparent that any will be finished before next summer A new hotel is however, now open to the station and is said to be quite good The old Hotel Angora has been closed and is being converted into a Bank The Grand Hotel is open but is not much used A restaurant has also been opened in the Grand Hotel but I did not visit it

...ouncil before peace was agreed on...exposed...British arguments. The ground had been carefully prepared... the British Government understanding that a new Italy now...was...sweeping into Turkey were resorting to...old tricks and were trotting out the same old charges. Massacres of Christians... these charges were to influence the League of Nations at their next... What would be the result? England would not...with the League if Nations took the very strong view that...about to...on 2 September. Eagerness...that the League of Nations...greatly feel uncertainty as to its...on the powers now...the Straits, who had...not wanted to...Italy's policy...opposed a person...that the...Commission of Inquiry was formed. The only...action taken was that the League of Nations was not...by bugaboo...that the League...brought the necessary pressure to bear upon the Turkish Government...first requirement for rights in...Eastern Question was for...Turkey to...that they...reserve their liberty of action.

...&c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 5863 194 44 — **No. 39**

Sir C. Lindsay to the Earl of Birkenhead (Received September 25)

(No. 724. Confidential.)
S...

Constantinople, September 24, 1925.

I...

...

...

...dispatches Nos 704 and 705 of 14th September and ...ease your great difficulties. I feel however I must make every endeavour to ascertain exactly definite about Russian intrigue

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E 6028 194 44 No 43

Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople) to Marquess Curzon (Received October 3)

No 734 Secret

Sir *Therapia September 28 1923*

With reference to my despatch No 704 dated the 4th ...ing the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne I regret to report that the President is becoming more and more hostile to the Christian element in the population of the State and the recent disturbances in the Angora district are evidently likely to be made an excuse for His Excellency to ...ate further oppressive measures against the Christians. The Angora Deputies are very strongly opposed to any ...ation of the Treaty and the Christians have been subjected to ...ous persecution. The Turkish Government have also been ...ed by the Nationalist Party in the Assembly and by the Press to denounce the Treaty of Lausanne and to ...ate the Capitulations. These attempts have hitherto been unsuccessful but the Christians are still in a very precarious position. His Majesty's Government have ...ed the Turkish Government that they will hold them responsible for the safety of British subjects and their property and have ...ed that any infringement of the Treaty will be followed by ...ate action.

2 The recent attempt of the Turkish Government to ...ate the Capitulations has been strongly opposed by the Allied Representatives here and they have decided to strike hard at the Government's finances by refusing to grant any further ...ances to the Turkish Government until the Capitulations question is settled. I have supported my colleagues in this policy and have ...ed that the interests of Turkish Russian subjects should be safeguarded. I do not however think that the Soviet Government will succeed in getting the Capitulations abolished.

3 The Turkish Government is ...ly anxious to ...ate a treaty with Russia and the Kemalist Press have been ...ing Soviet Russia for the ...ance which they have received from her during the present crisis. The Kemalists have also been ...ing Angora as the seat of the Government of Turkey and have ...ed that the Embassies should leave Constantinople and ...ish themselves at Angora. I do not however think that the Kemalists will succeed in getting the Embassies to leave Constantinople.

4 The Turkish Government is ...ly anxious to ...ate a treaty with Russia and the Kemalist Press have been ...ing Soviet Russia for the ...ance which they have received from her during the present crisis. The Kemalists have also been ...ing Angora as the seat of the Government of Turkey and have ...ed that the Embassies should leave Constantinople and ...ish themselves at Angora. I do not however think that the Kemalists will succeed in getting the Embassies to leave Constantinople.

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

E 6189 1976 44 No 44

Mr Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received October 12)

No 111

Sir *Washington October 4 1923*

I HAVE the honour to inform Mark Bristol the United States Foreign Commissioner at Smyrna that His Majesty's Government ...ously bring about the recognition of the United States of America by Turkey. It is ...ed that the King Government ...ed the wish of the United States Government ...ssed to them by Mr Bristol.

Various ...ate ...ces have been ...ed in the Turkish ...ers to the effect that ...ican writers ...ed ...ed. Mr Bristol ...ed that ...assistance ...ress ...ggah...

the arguments at his disposal to attempt to prove why the United States should recognise the present Turkish regime. He pointed out that whereas all the Powers who had fought against Turkey had now recognised her the United States who had only broken off diplomatic relations but had never declared war, were standing out against recognition. He made much of the fact that Turkey was now a sister Republic and pointed out that the United States of America were not asked to protect minorities, or to undertake any obligations, and that it would be very much to the advantage of the United States to recognise the Turkish Republic.

I am told that in ...ing Admiral Bristol has been careful not to criticise openly Great Britain's attitude towards Turkey, he has ...ated that he thinks Turkey has been hardly treated by us.

I understand that Sir ...ter Townley's personal sympathy with Admiral Bristol's views.

I have &c
H ...

E 6197 1944 44 No 45

Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople) to Marquess Curzon (Received October 12)

No 771 Confidential

Sir *Constantinople October 6 1923*

IN the course of my ...ation with the German Ambassador regarding the preceding despatch I ...ed to No 749 of the 1st October I brought to the Turkish Government's notice the ...ess with which Soviet Russia had ...ed the Treaty of Kars, which was ...ed by her on the 13th October, and I suggested that the terms of the Treaty of Kars might form a basis for negotiations between the Turkish Government and the Soviet Government. I ...ed Herr Nadolny's ...ion to the ...ance which Russia had given to the Kemalists during the ...ish War, and I ...ed that the Soviet Government had ...ed to keep the terms of the Treaty of Kars and that the Soviet Government had ...ed the Capitulations.

2 He ...ed that Tewfik Saraz...a was now in ...ession of Constantinople and that the Russian Government had ...ed with the Angora Government. He ...ed to the ...ance which Russia had given to the Kemalists during the ...ish War, and he ...ed that the Soviet Government had ...ed to keep the terms of the Treaty of Kars and that the Soviet Government had ...ed the Capitulations.

3 Herr Nadolny ...ed his views with considerable ...ation. He ...ed that the Soviet Government had ...ed to keep the terms of the Treaty of Kars and that the Soviet Government had ...ed the Capitulations.

4 M Frunze, the Soviet Commissary for War, ...ed to Constantinople on the 1st October. He left Moscow on the 2nd October. He ...ed to Constantinople on the 3rd October. He ...ed to Constantinople on the 4th October. He ...ed to Constantinople on the 5th October. He ...ed to Constantinople on the 6th October.

I have &c
R LINDSAY

E 6200 1091 44 No 46

Sir R Lindsay (Constantinople) to Marquess Curzon (Received October 21)

(No 750)

Sir *Constantinople October 1 1923*

I HAVE the honour to ...ge the receipt of your telegram No 1 of the 1st October ...ing the reports which ...ed in the ...ess of the ...est in Constantinople and ...ing my observations on the news. I regret to say that I have no news which ...ld ...ify the ...ed ...ess

quite remarkable how little Constantinople knows of events in the eastern vilayets, but perhaps hardly surprising for there are very few Europeans there except in the coast towns and no Turkish newspapers keep any correspondents in the provinces. Even during the recent rebellion the only news received here was that which the Government at Angora gave out to the local press.

2. I frequently heard in Constantinople that the Turkish authorities are still uneasy about the Kurdish situation and in the conversation I had with Tewfik Rushdi just before he went to Geneva, he gave me to understand that the Government still found it necessary to keep a sharp eye on the disaffected in general. So far as the Kurds themselves are concerned I have already heard from a source that I consider reliable that the position is somewhat as follows. The late revolt only embraced a comparatively small number of tribes, the more important clans and chiefs especially those of the Dersim district stood aside and these latter were not affected by the repressive measures that were followed in the case of Sheik Said and his followers. For the moment the leanings of the interested tribes are of course towards the Turkish Government but it is feared that new attempts to break up the power of these powerful chiefs may be made on their lands at this season of the year when they are free from the deep snows that cut off communications in the winter months.

3. It is not unlikely that I may receive from Mr. Russell Knight at Erzerum His despatches will be more interesting and I think that at this season of the year he would prefer to be there than at Constantinople.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 6368 1786 44 No. 47

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received October 19*)

No. 766 Confidential

Sir, *Constantinople October 12, 1925*

I had an interesting conversation on the 10th instant with M. Radev the Bulgarian delegate. He also spent the whole of last August in Angora negotiating the terms of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty. He returned to Sofia at the end of the latter month, and I did not therefore then meet him. As this was through Constantinople he was now on his way to Angora to conclude the negotiations. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva and they together settled the points at issue and M. Radev professed the hope that he might be able to get to Angora long enough to sign the document on the 15th. The terms are already practically settled and when he will go straight on to his new post at Washington. Perhaps it may be right this time. But one cannot help remembering the several previous occasions on which Bulgarian relations have been on the point of a settlement.

2. His remarks concerning the frontiers at Angora were interesting. His Majesty's Government will observe that after all even Rushdi Bey represented these matters as being of secondary importance. He also confirmed what I have reported in the past strongly the genuine anxiety of the Turkish Government to avoid serious friction with His Majesty's Government in the frontier dispute that have two great objects to destroy the town of Mosul and to be relieved from the Mosul Question. It has been a much debated point in the past whether Rushdi Bey was sent to Geneva to bring back the Mosul question with him or to leave it behind. The most that can be said is that the Turkish Government were not unwilling that the question should be raised, but that they were not prepared to take the initiative. Rushdi Bey's instructions were to the effect that if the question of the Mosul frontier were raised he was to refer to the Angora Government for instructions. He was not to take the initiative in raising the question himself. Rushdi Bey's own view was that the Mosul question was not ripe for settlement and that it would be better to leave it alone for the present. He was not unwilling to discuss it, but he was not prepared to take the initiative in raising it himself.

3. The general line at Angora is to attract into Turkey the largest possible number of Turkish populations from Azerbaijan, Turkestan or anywhere else in order to remedy the terrible depopulation of Anatolia. For this reason it is

ten or fifteen years they may be able to accomplish much in this direction and that, with a steady pursuance of the present policy of progress and modernisation, Turkey may reacquire sufficient strength to view the future with calm confidence. They fear greatly lest in this interval there should be a reactionary revolution in Russia. From that country, as now constituted, they do not anticipate any actual aggression, but under an imperialist or openly capitalist régime they think the menace to Turkey would be very serious if it matured before Turkey had recuperated her strength. They therefore attach importance to keeping the strength of the British Empire available as a reserve both for the immediate and for the more distant future.

4. M. Radev told me that Ismet Pasha's position with the Ghazi is entirely unimpaired. It is true he said, that while Ismet is rather an austere man having a quiet home life Tewfik Rushdi is a jovial fellow who goes with others in relishing the festivities of the Ghazi's entertainments. From the apparent intimacy thus arising between the President and His Minister for Foreign Affairs a marked jealousy has sprung up between the hangers on of Rushdi and those of Ismet, but the relations of the latter with the President were as close and cordial as ever. I hope this is true, and that the reluctance I expressed in my despatch No. 704 of the 14th September last was unfounded.

5. You will recollect that when I was at Angora last May Ismet Pasha left me to receive me separately. No. 581 of the 18th May. M. Radev's visit to Angora as far as I could ascertain travelled back with me from Angora as far as Eskishehir and I told him of the incident. He has since found out that the reason for it was that Zekai Bey had asked for an interview with Mr. Ballard and had been put off. The decision that Ismet should not receive me but the emissary Zekai Bey was taken as a measure of retaliation for my not having called upon Ismet during his visit to Angora. This is the only probable reason for Ismet's behaviour as I mentioned at the time. It is possible that a private letter to the Foreign Office last May. It is possible that it will be repeated here as something that I could not ascertain with certainty. But I do not think so. I feel sure that the subject was not mentioned by Tewfik Rushdi when he left Geneva.

6. M. Radev is very well acquainted at Geneva and speaks Turkish. He has friends at Angora in influential positions who were his schoolmates and his intercourse is good. He spoke to me also at Geneva in regard to the Bulgarian interest in the Mosul question, but I did not think it worth while to take up with him the Turkish attitude over Mosul.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 6371 194 44 No. 48

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received October 19*)

No. 773

Sir, *Constantinople October 7, 1925*

THE President of the republic has been absent from Angora for the past three weeks or more at Western Anatolia, beginning with Brussa where he remained about a month. It seems to have been a quiet if hard and perhaps at times trying holiday from the attack of overwork at the capital. He saw our guest here, certainly not Sir Harry Pilcock ex-Khedive Egypt, but possibly they may have political dealings but the more natural explanation seems to be that between the serious illness at the large and private fortune of the late Bankass (the Minister of Affairs) who died early this year, and the papers were in great confusion and investments of all kinds. The ex-Khedive's solicitor took at Brussa [illegible] of which the President expressed the wish that everything at Brussa [illegible] with as much success as she now has to some extent, and such changes Adana. He will [illegible] part of his time towards that direction. Arrow, [illegible] the "Nautilus" was [illegible] and President [illegible] Varnier returning to Medan [illegible] evening, the [illegible] part of his [illegible] here.

2. After excursions [illegible] Brussa, [illegible] left proceeded via Panormus, Balikesir and Manisa to Smyrna where he [illegible] days. He have been [illegible] visited [illegible] of the [illegible] my speeches

have been scattered. The Greeks are strong the most moderate Nationalism combined with, for instance at Smyrna were conferment to that town's old appellation of Caesar Ismir. He said that the approach had been removed and would never again be allowed to stay the city. The striking feature of the addresses made to the President was the tone of almost incredible flattery which was poured through them. At Balikesir the mayor said: It God sent to Mahomet the Koran that Mahomet was the last of the prophets Ismet is the first, O Ghazi from whom arises a prophet. Christ raised the dead and gave sight to the blind but from last given came self expression to the Turkish people thou hast granted most wishes which I dare not utter. The Ghazi received these tributes with composure and the papers reproduce them in columns of print.

3. The object of the Pasha tour is to address the campaign of nationalism with especial reference to the assistance of hats for ozes who, now, perhaps unfortunately, is determined to pay the wholesale price. Wherever the Ghazi has passed through he has received ovations of fezes and Constantinople even the charge is marked. You can see little in Europe but hear to say. Para and the deputies are being urged to wear to each other putting their carcasses into hats. Stamboul is reconservative and bigoted.

4. The Great National Assembly is to meet again on the 23rd October, and as the day draws near, so does the most jealous manoeuvres. In the first place there are a number of elections to be held, the supplementary vacancies rendered necessary by the promotion of Pasha and Refet Bey. At Constantinople there were two places to be filled, and to the general surprise of observers Ismet Pasha, who was expected to stand for Angora, put forward the name of Fethi Bey, the Republican leader. The latter was returned by 282 votes to 12 against. The only other candidature against was that of Ali Haidar Bey, who stood as an Independent. Ali Haidar Bey, however, met with a severe defeat, receiving only 18 votes. Refet Pasha says it was surprising that the Progressives still obtained eighteen or twenty votes, but I am inclined to think that the Progressives, instead of being a party, were a mere group of malcontents who wished to express their views without actually joining the Opposition.

5. Angora seems to be divided into two camps. Progressives back to the fold, and fearful of their future, and Ali Haidar Pasha, who, however, met with a severe defeat at the polls, is trying to get them to resign their deputyships, as they have been returned to represent their constituents. As these elections only serve to increase the

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 6502 362 65] No. 49

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe.

No. 454.
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 27.*

I TOOK advantage of a visit of courtesy paid to me by the French Ambassador to refer once to speak to him of the reported passage of Turkish troops through Syria. He informed me that the assurances given to Mr. Phipps by M. Berthelot in the latter's telegram No. 207 of that date and by M. Herriot on the 9th September as reported by Mr. Phipps in a private letter. I said that I was afraid that the Turkish Government was seeking permission for the passage first of a mixed detachment, that this gave me some concern, and that I thought that the Turks were contemplating an attack upon Irak. I did not see what excuse for such movements of troops they could give to the League of Nations. I trusted that if any troops were allowed to pass at all they would be very small numbers, and that the French Government would assist to avoid the risk of such a little incident as might be brought about by a misunderstanding between the two countries.

M. Herriot told me that from the Quai d'Orsay point which reached him through ordinary channels he had seen that some such demands as I described were made, and that the French Government had instructed their Embassy in Constantinople to make strong objections. He would report to M. Briand what I had said.

I then told His Excellency that I must speak to him about Damascus. He asked rather eagerly if I had any news, and I said that he had been intending to put this question to me.

I read to him with very slight omissions and alterations the text of telegram No. 20 of the 21st October from Consul Smart. I said that I thought it my duty to bring this report to his notice. Some account of the incident might reach this country in private letters, and I thought it better to speak frankly to him about it at once.

M. de Fleuriau thanked me for giving him this information. He said that as one who had had some experience of the East and Far East the things which he had read had produced a very bad impression upon his own mind, which had been confirmed and strengthened by the telegram which I had just read to him. So he said, he added, all these Eastern questions depended upon personality.

I then ventured upon the observation that such a rumour as came to me made me feel that the French Government ought to be very vigilant, and that it might well be that a serious situation would develop in Syria. I would not blame either the Soviet or Turkish Governments had those treaties.

M. de Fleuriau seemed to think that the Turks had little influence upon the disturbances, though they were not displeased by them. He thought the activities of the Soviet Government more dangerous.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 6527 175 44] No.

Sir R. Lindsay to the Right Hon. Austen Chamberlain. (Received October 26.)

No. 755.
Sir, *Constantinople, October 16, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Mosul is the only outstanding question of importance. My French colleague and the Secretary-General both told me that the statement contained more truth than usually to be found in political despatches. There is very little prospect that for some time to come the relations between Great Britain and Turkey

Russia.

2. In spite of divers and frequent provocations since 1920 the Soviet Government and the present Turkish Government have many points of interest. Russian activity towards the south and the striking of warlike flourishes of trumpets, but it is that there is an unpleasant strain between the two countries, and that of the Caucasus. The future is obscure, but in spite of all that has happened in Russia, it is not impossible that a right can be expected to exist on the left where Turkey would not wish to be brought into the scene. It is impossible to say whether the Soviet Government is sincere in its desire for peace, quietness and neighbourliness, but it may be noted that Russia and Bulgaria are the only two countries with which Turkey has concluded treaties of friendship since the Russian, quite essentially, where Turkey is concerned.

Great Britain.

3. Similarly, Great Britain's relations with Turkey are not entirely what it was in the days when Constantinople was the centre of British interests, when Embassies and Consulates were to be found in every part of the Ottoman Empire, when British subjects and British goods were to be found in every part of the Ottoman Empire, when British subjects and British goods were to be found in every part of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Lausanne has done away with many of the causes of friction which existed between Great Britain and Turkey in the past. On the other hand there is no reason why Great Britain should not be on the most friendly terms with Turkey. There is no reason why Great Britain should not be on the most friendly terms with Turkey. There is no reason why Great Britain should not be on the most friendly terms with Turkey.

Turkey

4. Chastened by fifteen years of war the young Turkish Republic, in common with the rest of the world, looks forward to-day to a breathing-space, and prepares to set to work to the best advantage. Modernisation is the heart and soul of its policy. Industrialisation and secularisation are its necessary landmarks. In all that the Turks do there seems to be a definite mould and if their ideals there may be a plentiful absence of logic, of their conclusions a deep sincerity and they are pursuing the realisation of them with passion. In the modernisation part of their programme they have the Japanese example before their eyes and they purpose not only to adopt the everyday things that steam, petrol and electricity can provide, but also to remodel from top to bottom their codes and their administrative and social structures. Secularisation, so far, has not degenerated into mere outburst of crude atheism. It has adopted as a corollary the principle of State with the purpose of making a progressive improvement possible. Hence, it has been directed into their own native channels. In particular, the Turks seem to understand that Islam is not to be stifled with the weapons of rationalism and suffocated. Nationalism, on the other hand, has been encouraged to the full for the first time having been the ideal of the people at large. It now constitutes the driving power behind the whole programme of the Government. More important still, it provides to the Turks a substitute for that which is lost through secularisation. The Turks are to-day a united people. A child of a State into which no Turkish blood has ever entered, every Turkish-speaking peasant in the whole Anatolian plateau is a Turk by conviction.

With the progress of the various Turkish enterprises I should hope to bring every year new events to show the growth of strength and power which will enable the Turks to feel that they can afford to be more tolerant towards foreigners. The increasing prosperity of the country and the growing confidence of the Turks in their own capacity to manage their own affairs will, I trust, make it possible for His Majesty's Government to feel less reluctant on this point to express the hope that it is in the interest that the Lausanne effort should be crowned with success.

Kurdistan

5. The Angora Government's first set-back was a severe shock to their prestige. The rebellion in Kurdistan, which is Kurdish not Turkish and the Kurds are Moslems, has been put down by the Government's troops with a ruthlessness which seems to us somewhat barbarous. It was a deliberate policy of terrorism, and it succeeded. Kurdistan is now pacified, and the Government's troops have been withdrawn. The Kurds have been disarmed, and the Government has taken into exile the principal chiefs. Whether the Government will feel less reluctant on this point to express the hope that it is in the interest that the Lausanne effort should be crowned with success.

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E 6528 6528 44] No. 1

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received October 26.*)

(No. 786.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 18, 1925.*

TURKISH reactions towards events in Persia are always interesting, and on the 15th instant the Ikdam of Midhat published an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on future Persian relations. It was doubtless provoked by the recent disturbances in Persia and by the impression that the Shah was returning to his capital, the news that he had postponed his journey not having yet appeared in the local press. Tevfik Rushdi Bey said that of course Turkey could not, and would herself put the affairs of other countries and her relations with them were always increasingly cordial. The best results were to be expected from the series of visits noted in Reza Khan, the head of the Persian Government, and he was confident that the Persian nation would be able to overcome any difficulties that might arise.

2. This attitude of the Minister is doubtless partly due to the wish of Angora that not another Asiatic State should put itself under Soviet influence, but partly also to Reza Khan's anti-Russian proclivities. I ascribed the spring visits noted in No. 430 of the 2nd instalment of the Persian correspondence, which aroused much comment at the time, to the fact that the Turkish Government considered that Turkey ever since the Angora Government had been established had been on the best of terms with Persia, whereas the Russians, as I noted in my despatch No. 1,180 of the 30th December last, had been trying to undermine Turkish influence at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 6533 194 44 No. 2

Sir R. Lindsay to Austen Chamberlain. (*Received October 26.*)

(No. 791.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 20, 1925.*

IN my despatch No. 787 of the 18th instant I submitted some observations on Angora matters which might be certain to attract attention in connection with the internal politics of this country, but it may be well that I should explain somewhat more fully in this despatch the views therein expressed concerning the Kurdish question in the sense of showing that the Government's action in the matter was not only justifiable but was also the only course which could be taken.

2. It is difficult for a foreigner, who is not in touch with the daily life of the people, to understand what are the real issues at stake in the internal affairs of the country. Many countries in the last twenty years have been subjected to ideas which were new and untried, and which, in the case of Oriental countries, have also come into contact with ancient traditions and customs. Turkey has not escaped this ordeal, and has been subjected to the full stress of it, with the result that many of the progressive reforms which statesmen have had in mind for the betterment of their country have had to be postponed. Orthodoxy, for example, would not allow the Caliphate to be abolished without the simultaneous abolition of the Sultanate, and the Sultanate could not be abolished together with the Caliphate without the risk of a religious upheaval. Again, the Kurdish question is one which has been in existence for many years, and which, if it had been dealt with in the early days of the Republic, would probably have been settled without much difficulty. Unfortunately, however, the Kurds, who are a fine race, have been allowed to remain in a state of primitive barbarism, and have been exploited by their chiefs, who have used them as a means of furthering their own personal ambitions. The Kurdish chiefs have been in the habit of playing off the Turkish Government against the Persian Government, and vice versâ, and have been allowed to do so with impunity. Their power has been based on the fact that they have been able to call out their tribesmen to fight for them, and the tribesmen have been willing to do so because they have been accustomed to look upon their chiefs as their natural leaders. Now that the Government has decided that the time has come to put an end to this state of affairs, the chiefs have naturally resisted, and have succeeded in inducing the Kurds to rise in rebellion. The Government has had to put down the rebellion by force of arms, and has had to deport the chiefs in order to prevent them from stirring up trouble again. The Kurds have been disarmed, and the Government has taken into exile the principal chiefs. Whether the Government will feel less reluctant on this point to express the hope that it is in the interest that the Lausanne effort should be crowned with success.

exalting the national nature than its material basis the object for whose benefit all national effort should be exerted. Other countries have selected as meeting their Royal Houses completely with the attitude of Turkey. No effort in that direction has been made, partly no doubt owing to the effete character of the Ottoman princes, mainly however because the Caliphate as far as England is concerned can hardly be expected to take the lead in any movement of reform which must assume a strongly secular character. In recent the opposite course has been followed especially in regard to the Caliphate every effort exerted to depress the prestige of the Head of Islam and to weaken his influence for what events have clearly proved the nation, what principle has as its material interest and instinct. As I said recently the Imperial House and news paper reproached the doctrine of a mere priest as a sort of ruling caste and spoke of the Caliphate as a kind of Papacy. It is this conception of Islam the Young Ottomanist and Young Turk party which has been dragged at the chariot wheels of Germany and which has led them to the East. On the other hand Turkish statesmen have exalted the rights of the Caliphate as the symbol of the Turkish Empire and of the Turkish race and appeal to all Muslims throughout the world as Turks. It was as Caliph that Mustafa Kemal Pasha entered into the Treaty of Sèvres and even now Islam that is set against Europe in the name of which his foreign policy is actually directed. Islam and Islamism are the two poles of Turkish nationality. Islam is the chart of the past, Islamism the present. Islam is the basis and Islamism the superstructure of Turkish nationality.

It is necessary to emphasize the importance of Islam and Islamism in view of the assertion which has been made that Turkey is a purely secular State. However well founded the assertion may be as regards the Turkish Government the Turkish people remain what they have been for centuries a Muslim people. Any observer can see that the *mihrabs* and minarets of the Western Anatolian towns are filled with worshippers, while the churches are deserted. Apart from the Greeks, who do not form a large part of the population, the Christians are for the most part Armenians, who have been subjected to the most cruel persecution by the Turks. Moreover it is to be noted that the Armenians are a Turkish race converted to Christianity. Nearly all the Christians in Anatolia are Greeks, who have been converted to Islam. Even the Greeks, who have been converted to Islam, are not considered as Christians by the Turks. The Turks have always been very tolerant of the Christians, but they have never allowed them to have any political power. The Turks have always been very tolerant of the Christians, but they have never allowed them to have any political power. The Turks have always been very tolerant of the Christians, but they have never allowed them to have any political power.

5 Nor should we overlook the fact that the Turks themselves are deeply attached to the Caliphate. They have been accustomed to look up to the Caliph as their spiritual head, and they have been accustomed to look up to the Caliph as their spiritual head, and they have been accustomed to look up to the Caliph as their spiritual head.

6 Any attempt to suppress the Caliphate would be regarded by the Turks as a blow at the very heart of their religion. The Caliphate is the symbol of the unity of the Muslim world, and any attempt to suppress it would be regarded by the Turks as a blow at the very heart of their religion. The Caliphate is the symbol of the unity of the Muslim world, and any attempt to suppress it would be regarded by the Turks as a blow at the very heart of their religion.

7 I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

[E 6544 1231 44] No. 53

Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received October 26*)

No. 227

Sir, *Pera, October 22, 1923.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to an official statement, three agreements concluded between the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments were signed at Angora on the 8th October by M. Radeff and Tewfik Rouchdi Bey. These agreements are a treaty of friendship, a convention for the exchange of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian minority in Turkey, a supplementary protocol dealing with minority rights and the question of the property of refugees, and a convention regulating the rights of the nationals of the two countries residing within the territory of the other.

I have not as yet been able to secure copies of these documents, only a very brief summary of which has been published in the press. It appears, however, that the treaty of friendship, signed on the same day as the Treaty of Lausanne, is identical with the Turco-Greek Treaty of Lausanne. According to the supplementary protocol the question of minorities is settled on the basis of the Turco-Greek Convention, which has been in force since 1914. The question of the property of refugees has been settled on the basis of the Turco-Greek Convention of 1914. The question of the property of refugees has been settled on the basis of the Turco-Greek Convention of 1914.

I have, &c.

RALPH STEVENSON

[E 6688 1231 44] No. 54

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received November 2*)

(No. 814)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 22, 1923.*

WITH reference to Mr. Stevenson's despatch No. 227 of the 22nd instant, relative to a treaty concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey, I have the honour to report the following additional information which I have received from M. Radeff.

The problem of the minority in Turkey so far as I can understand was to be settled by transferring Bulgarian nationality to as large a number as possible of the Bulgarians who are ordinary Turkish subjects. Apart from the Turkish Government's desire to get rid of Bulgarian subjects, persons who emigrate from Bulgaria to Turkey since 1912 have been obliged to show Bulgarian nationality papers. Minorities are, as stated by Mr. Stevenson, safeguarded by the clauses of the Neuilly and Lausanne Treaties providing for reference of differences of interpretation to the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague or to the League of Nations. M. Radeff pointed out that the stipulations of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of 1913 signed at Constantinople, whereby Islam customs, some sort of religious and other extra-territorial rights were granted to Mussulmans, are all swept away by the new treaty, as signed.

I have, &c.

H. C. LINDSAY

E 6892 6528 44, No 55

Sir H. Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received November 2)

(No 809)

Sir, *Constantinople October 27, 1925.*

IN continuation of my despatch No 786 of the 15th instant respecting the Turkish attitude towards Reza Khan, I have the honour to report that the Persian Ambassador called on me yesterday by appointment.

2. The conversation with his Excellency was at first somewhat perfunctory. We started on the subject of tea, which by universal consent is the graduation novel of the Near East. Constantinople is the Bond Street of Turkey and Egypt. We discussed the principal buildings and sights of this town. I am sending Prince Belli, belonging to a rich Greek family, through to the Prefecture of Constantinople Enquête Bey, who naturally brought to the conclusion that October 29th, 1925, three years after the proclamation of the Republic, would be a suitable date for the celebration of the Persian revolution. The Prefecture would therefore, in the bazaars, etc., the streets of Galata and Pera would be decorated with Persian and Turkish flags, and after the usual speeches and banquets, etc., there would be a display of fireworks in the evening. His Excellency suggested that I should telegraph to His Majesty's Government asking them to instruct the Prefecture of Constantinople to this effect. I replied that I would do so, but that I thought it unlikely that the Turkish Government would agree to the proposal.

3. We resumed our conversation on more serious matters. The wheat shortage in Turkey was discussed, and I remarked that the Russian famine of 1922 had been followed by an abundant harvest in Russia. The Russian famine of 1924 was also followed by a good harvest. His Excellency replied that he had received a telegram from Angora stating that the Turkish Government had decided to import wheat from Persia, and that he had been instructed to ascertain whether the Persian Government would be willing to grant facilities for the export of wheat from Persia to Turkey. His Excellency had replied that he was sure that the Persian Government would be willing to grant facilities for the export of wheat from Persia to Turkey, but that he would telegraph to Teheran to ascertain whether there was any truth in the report. His Excellency then went on to say that he had been instructed by his Government

traité. Ne seulement les [illegible] ne sont pas [illegible] leur application sacrée [illegible] [illegible]. Des temps en temps, des vagues informations [illegible] de caractère favorable circulent dans la presse, dans le public. Parallèlement, des nouvelles plus inquiétantes se sont portées [illegible] hors pays. Ces deux courants appartiennent à deux courants [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Constantinople, car la crise sur les biens précédents abandonnés frappe également cette catégorie de personnes comme les Ambassades ainsi qu'il est signalé dans leurs précédents mémoires. Ces ventes ont eu lieu notamment à Smyrne, à Adana, à Broussa, à Angora, à Erzeroum, à Erzingian, à Keskime, à Rodosto, à Eski-Chéhir et à Ismidt à des prix très au-dessous de leur valeur et souvent dérisoires. A Eski-Chéhir une vigne de quelques dekaums (dekaum = 1 are 1/2 environ) aurait été adjugée aux enchères, huit cents livres turques ce qui, au cours actuel, ne peut être évalué jusqu'à présent, qu'environ à une centaine de francs.

Cette longue liste est loin d'être complète, il en existe encore d'autres parmi lesquels les Ambassades ont dû assister aux ventes prises obtenues par les Arméniens catholiques et latins de Mersine et de Tarsus contre l'église et les églises arméniennes catholiques de ces villes. Ces églises, qui appartiennent également à la communauté arménienne catholique, ont été vendues à vil prix à des particuliers musulmans.

Ces différentes personnes ont pu, à bon droit, être considérées comme étant sous la protection de leurs Ambassades respectives, mais il n'en a pas été de même pour les biens abandonnés qui, ainsi que nous l'avons déjà dit, ont été vendus à vil prix.

Ces ventes ont été faites par les Commissions spéciales nommées par le Gouvernement ottoman, dans le but de liquider les biens abandonnés par les Arméniens déportés ou ayant fui devant l'ennemi, ainsi que par l'Evkaf d'Angora, administration spéciale du Vilayet.

Ces biens abandonnés arméniens ont été vendus à des prix dérisoires, sans que les Ambassades aient été prévenues, malgré les promesses faites par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Les Ambassades ont protesté contre ces ventes illégales et ont demandé que les biens vendus leur soient restitués ou que les acquéreurs soient remboursés par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Ces protestations sont restées sans effet.

Instructions données

D'après un avis publié par un journal local, de nouvelles instructions viennent d'être données par le Ministère des Finances concernant l'administration des Biens abandonnés.

Ces instructions visent notamment les biens de certains étrangers séquestrés pendant la guerre générale. Les Ambassades alliées se renseigneront sur ce point spécial dont elles n'ont pas eu connaissance jusqu'à présent.

Elles croient devoir communiquer à leurs Gouvernements ce document dont il s'agit en attirant leur attention en particulier sur le dernier paragraphe et sur la dernière phrase. L'Administration des biens abandonnés continue inlassablement ses opérations de ventes. On espère que, grâce aux nouveaux employés qui ont élargi le cadre de cette institution, un grand nombre de ces dossiers seront mis à jour à bref délai.

ANNEXE I

Renseignements tirés des documents de l'Banque Arménienne de Constantinople

Les propriétés ci-dessous détaillées ont été vendues publiquement par la Direction des Biens abandonnés de Smyrne à partir de juillet

	£T.
Jusqu'au 15 Août 19[illegible]	
La maison de Mariam, fille de Agop, pour	3
" " Mariam Sirpouhi Mgurditchi et Art	150
" Grilli Pilo de Agop	450
" Arakiatzi de Ohan	1,500
" " Vartan Sherbetdji	1
" Yenovik Gabriel	80
" Arakiak Mnassakan	200
" Prêtre Hatchadour	650
" Eva Aghassi	6
" "	3 50
" " Takouhi Spartali (avec ses enfants)	900
Jusqu'au 10 août 19[illegible]	
La maison de Mariam Carasteh	7 00
" Agop Varoujan	9 500
" Kevork Arakzanian	9 [illegible]
" Agop Ohanian	1,500
Le champ de Bedros Bekdjian	2, 00
Jusqu'au 20 août 1920	
La maison de Mardiros Mikaelian	250
Le magasin de Kevork Sogeroh	400
La maison de Marcos Avedis	1,850
" " Hovsep Petrossian	80
" " Diran Ogli Ohanes Marinos	3 00
" " Hadji Zakaria Arslanian	200
" " Nevrig, épouse de Ieau Photograph	1,000
" " Luc, Migerditch Mikaelian	1 4 0
" " Mardiros Ohanessian	1,500
" " Marie fille de Agop	950
" " Sarkis Israelian	1 4 0
" " Hadji Ohannes	1,850
" " Ieau Vartanian	90
" " Marie Sarafian	90
" " Garabed Agapetos	3,00
" " Hadji Vartan Ogli Ohannes	1,50
" " Vartan, fille de Kevork Sogeroh	1,3 0
" " Zarouhi Vartouhi	700
" " Maria, Hadji Garabed Spartali (avec ses enfants)	1[illegible]500
Les magasins de Ouzounes Agop Arslanian	10 [illegible]2 500
La maison de Sirpouhi Mgurditch Nalbandian	4 00
" " Rosa Garabed Arslanian	4 00
" " Rosa Hadji Ezra Djemaldin	4 00

Jusqu'au 20 août 1[illegible]	£ T
[illegible] de Vrsine Hadj Kasper	1 800
	1,250
	2 500
	3 000
	1 000
	4, 000
La succursale Mission Arménienne Trapezunte	500
[illegible] Agop Bedros Arakelian	2,800
Ross Mgrditch Derderian	1 000
	2 500
Mme Varsenig Balasian	500
	500
Iorig Setrak	300
La succursale Mission Arménienne Diarbekir	1 500
[illegible] Agop Mgrditch	400
Essai Lazo Kechichian Karyanni	1 000
Kirkor Mardiros Elzibar	400
Kirkor Serkis Sirkis	100
Artin Sadik Artin Kerestedji	300
Hadji Kapor	1 500
Sirkis Mardiros	1 000
Mme Marguerite Bedros	1 500

Les Directeurs des Banques ottomanes ont été priés de contribuer à cette œuvre de bienfaisance. Plusieurs d'entre eux ont déjà répondu à notre appel et nous ont fait parvenir des listes de souscription qui ont été closes le 15 août dernier. Nous donnerons ci-dessous les noms des souscripteurs et le montant de leurs souscriptions.

Les personnes ci-dessous désignées ont été chargées par le Comité de Secours aux Réfugiés de Smyrne de recueillir des souscriptions en faveur de ces malheureux.

	£ T
Les employés de la Banque Ottomane [illegible]	18 00
[illegible]	8 0
Makredji Salomon	7 00
	2 00
[illegible]	0
[illegible] Kerkorian	17 00
Mme Kevork Kerkorian	17 00
Mme Garabed Kerkorian	17 14
[illegible]	2 17
La succursale Mission Arménienne Samsoun	4 17
Agop Khatcherian	0 0

Listes de souscriptions recueillies par Messieurs Nazar Djanegyan, [illegible] Bezdjian

Liste [illegible] Pesag Artin, [illegible] Safra

Liste [illegible] Hadji Agop Boyadjian, [illegible] Cafa

Liste [illegible] Hadji Agop Boyadjian, [illegible] Kara Agatz

Listes diverses

[illegible] le Service Sanitaire de Smyrne	2 500
Le coiffeur Artin	1 685
le Artin Kerkevan	1,575

	£ T
Listes diverses	
Les deux épiciers de Capazoglou Hadji Agop et Garabed Mgrditch	18 0
La succursale de Mouradiye tailleur	11 12
[illegible] Barsam Agop	4 0
[illegible] Hadji Partog	1, 0
[illegible] Hadji Ohanes	7 00
[illegible] Mussak	1 0
[illegible] Tchamlidjian Agop	10
[illegible] Avedis	2, 0
[illegible] Ouadjian Artin	17 0
Saatdji Ermon	1 0
[illegible] Hadji Agop, charpentier	3 0
[illegible] Hadji Agop marchand de [illegible]	1
Carcasbe, forgeron	
Cara Kehia	3
Kircor forgeron	1 0
Les deux épiciers de Kevorkian frères	5 8 0

Les propriétés mises aux enchères à Constantinople

Les propriétés ci-dessous ont été mises aux enchères publiques à la date du septembre :

	£ T
[illegible] Banque Ottomane [illegible] Garabed Stamboul Street à Rodosto [illegible]	2
Association Nationale Arménienne Stamboul [illegible] Fener [illegible]	10 0
[illegible] Arménienne à Rodosto, Stamboul Street à Yeni [illegible]	5 0
[illegible] Hospice Arménien de Hatchbeyir Stamboul Street à Yeni [illegible]	1,850
Mardik Arakelian	1,550
[illegible]	
[illegible] Demirdjian [illegible] Abrahamian Stamboul Street Yeni [illegible]	2,250
[illegible] Safferian [illegible] Stamboul Street à Bakaldere	3,2 0
Les meubles et ustensiles divers appartenant au Dr Lutchos Kyparissiotis Pera, Sans Agate	783

N.B. - Diverses propriétés situées aux environs d'Angora, Trébizonde, Keskesa, Rodosto, Eskischir et Ismid ont été mises aux enchères publiques. Les prix obtenus n'ont pas été communiqués aux enchères jusqu'à ce jour.

ANNEXE II

Journal "La Gazette" du 2 Octobre 1923

Nouvelles instructions de la Sublime Porte aux Préfets sur l'administration des Biens abandonnés

On sait que la Direction générale des Biens abandonnés institué à Constantinople est rattachée au Ministère des Finances. Et voilà pourquoi, entre autres, ses attributions se trouvent directement limitées par celles des Biens abandonnés des Grecs, des Arméniens et des Juifs. C'est à cette Direction générale que ressortissent les propriétés des absents et disparus.

Les biens abandonnés sont répartis en quatre catégories, à savoir : 1° ceux appartenant à des ressortissants qui, ayant quitté le Constantinople et qui ont été déclarés absents par le tribunal compétent ; 2° ceux appartenant à des sujets ottomans absents de Constantinople et qui ont été déclarés absents par le tribunal compétent ; 3° ceux appartenant à des sujets ottomans absents de Constantinople et qui, ayant quitté la ville depuis le 19 janvier 1918, n'ont pas encore été déclarés absents de Constantinople et

[illegible] sont été [illegible] par session. La Commission des Nations Unies aux sujets très [illegible] Réparations et avant-projets [illegible] dommages qui [illegible] [illegible] Ministère des Finances, [illegible] Général [illegible] des Forces Armées [illegible] et par [illegible].

Les [illegible] [illegible] première seconde et troisième catégories pourront être [illegible] [illegible] par [illegible] Direction des Domaines nationaux, et [illegible] [illegible] assez élevé.

On [illegible] déjà [illegible] formalités [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

8 *Army* -The usual military notices of expenditure army are uttered

9 *Finance* -The national is congratulated, that in a year when a wide mobilisation was necessary and an important tax like the Tithe was abolished, it has yet been possible to carry on uninterrupted a programme of rural and railway development old taxes however still require readjusting and re-adaptation and it is estimated clearly that these sacrifices will be required from the taxpayer

10. In general, it is to be noted that the greater and more important part of the speech is devoted to internal affairs and this shows once more how very much self-centred the nation and how much peace pervades its workers The policy to be followed in the Government sphere is that of peace and moderation with repression where necessary to smooth the path of progress I may mention a passage that extraordinary change that passed over the whole aspect of the following Friday night when before the fateful news came of the Greek advance in Asia Minor a meeting took place and at such a meeting one can see that the people are ready to respond

Lastly I would call attention to the fact that the Government has decided to send a Mission to His Majesty's Court for the purpose of presenting to His Majesty the Congratulations of the Assembly on the occasion of his accession to the throne

I have &c

R. G. HINSLAY

E 7046 194 44 No 9

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Henderson (Received November 16)

No. 84

Constantinople November 10, 1922

SIR, I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday the first debate of the new Assembly took place. It was of unusual interest and was opened by a speech from Ismet Pasha, the Grand Vizier, in which he gave a general review of the situation, both internal and external, and explained the policy which he intended to follow. He began by referring to the fact that the Assembly had met for the first time on the anniversary of the day on which the Sultan had left Constantinople, and he then proceeded to give a brief account of the events which had led to the Sultan's departure. He said that the Sultan had been guilty of treason in that he had entered into negotiations with the Allies behind the backs of the Government and the Assembly, and that he had thereby forfeited his position as Sovereign. He had therefore been deposed, and his cousin, Abdul Medjid Effendi, had been elected Caliph in his place. He then went on to say that the Government had decided to maintain the Sultanate and the Caliphate in the House of Osman, but that they had thought it necessary to separate the two offices, and to entrust the Caliphate to a member of the family who would be free from political responsibilities.

Ismet Pasha then proceeded to review the situation in Asia Minor. He said that the Greek army had been completely defeated, and that the Turkish troops were now in possession of the whole of the territory which they had lost. He had given orders that the Greek army was to be allowed to withdraw unmolested, and he hoped that the Greek Government would take steps to withdraw their troops from Eastern Thrace as soon as possible. He then referred to the question of the Straits, and said that the Turkish Government had always been willing to negotiate with the Powers concerned, and that they were still willing to do so. He hoped that a conference would be held at Constantinople, and that it would be attended by representatives of all the countries which had been at war with Turkey. He also hoped that the Straits would be entirely demilitarised, and that they would be placed under the control of the League of Nations. He concluded by saying that the Turkish Government desired to live on friendly terms with all the Powers, and that they were prepared to enter into negotiations with any of them for the purpose of concluding treaties of friendship and commerce.

The speech was received with great enthusiasm by the Assembly, and at the end of it the whole House rose and cheered for several minutes. The Grand Vizier was then elected President of the Assembly by acclamation, and he appointed his Ministers. The new Ministry is composed as follows:

[illegible]

4 It had been suggested that on the occasion of the debate on the address with the Opposition and that the Opposition leaders would at this debate reveal their views and be taken out of the bosom of the Popular party. Nothing of the kind happened although Kiazim Karabekir Pasha who spoke for the Opposition seems to have assumed the mildest of tones. He pleaded the critical position of the country as an excuse for not criticising Ismet Pasha's speech, and he stated that his object was to see that the Government secured the interests of the country. He pointed out however that the Government had given no reason for ousting even the Progressive party but had merely let it be known that it regarded it as an instrument of subversion and reaction. That charge cannot be substantiated.

5 On foreign policy Ismet Pasha spoke as follows:

During the last session our relations were still further extended. We have made agreements with countries with which hitherto we had no contacts, and we are on friendly and international terms with the new states of Europe and Asia. Our relations with Russia, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, are developing in a satisfactory manner. Our relations with Persia are of the most friendly character. Our commercial relations with Germany are developing. Our relations with Italy are also developing. Our relations with France are developing. Our relations with Great Britain are developing. Our relations with the United States are developing. Our relations with Japan are developing. Our relations with China are developing. Our relations with India are developing. Our relations with Egypt are developing. Our relations with Afghanistan are developing. Our relations with Persia are developing. Our relations with Arabia are developing. Our relations with Mesopotamia are developing. Our relations with Syria are developing. Our relations with Palestine are developing. Our relations with Transjordania are developing. Our relations with Hejaz are developing. Our relations with Yemen are developing. Our relations with Asir are developing. Our relations with Oman are developing. Our relations with Muscat are developing. Our relations with Bahrain are developing. Our relations with Kuwait are developing. Our relations with Qatar are developing. Our relations with the Trucial Coast are developing. Our relations with Aden are developing. Our relations with Socotra are developing. Our relations with Perim are developing. Our relations with Kamaran are developing. Our relations with Hanish are developing. Our relations with Mocha are developing. Our relations with Hodeida are developing. Our relations with Loheia are developing. Our relations with Salif are developing. Our relations with Midi are developing. Our relations with Hajjah are developing. Our relations with Amran are developing. Our relations with Sana are developing. Our relations with Dhamar are developing. Our relations with Yarim are developing. Our relations with Ibb are developing. Our relations with Taiz are developing. Our relations with Mocha are developing. Our relations with Hodeida are developing. Our relations with Loheia are developing. Our relations with Salif are developing. Our relations with Midi are developing. Our relations with Hajjah are developing. Our relations with Amran are developing. Our relations with Sana are developing. Our relations with Dhamar are developing. Our relations with Yarim are developing. Our relations with Ibb are developing. Our relations with Taiz are developing.

[illegible]

er into the question now recently at the treaty but that dealt with questions not at all known in the treaty It at it therefore broke up without really entering upon a discussion at all for we were confronted with proposals which were outside the spirit and scope of the treaty Subsequent events proved the correctness of our views as to the reason why the conference was broken off What I mean is that the question under discussion is the fate of the Mosul Vilayet That is what we were to discuss at That principle has been made clear both before the League of Nations and in the report issued as a result of the enquiries conducted by the League of Nations Commission You know what happened at the League of Nations after that During the discussions before the League we kept within the lines laid down by the Treaty of Lausanne That treaty was obtained at the cost of great sacrifices We wanted to settle the Mosul question in accordance with our rights under the treaty From first to last we have shown that we were ready and willing to settle the question amicably in accordance with the principles of the treaty and that we are always ready with the same attitude to discuss But that does not mean that we must give up all our rights which have been assured to us

6 Your observations on the growing Balkan rapprochement are not lost upon the Turkish statesmen to whom I allude in my despatch No 823 of the 4th instant With regard to the visit of Mustapha Ismet Pasha to Angora which I foresaw in that despatch as likely to take place but which in terms Mustapha Kemal denied to Mr Clayton on the 5th instant I have no further information to add to what I telegraphed on the 6th instant

7 At Ismet Pasha's departure from Angora Kiazim Karabekir Pasha the Governor-General of the Vilayet of Erzerum left for Constantinople by the Orient Express on the 21st instant It is stated that he is going to Constantinople for the purpose of attending the Council of Ministers which is to be held there on the 24th instant to consider the Mosul question and the Government seem to attach the greatest importance to his presence there and to the decisions which may be arrived at by the Council

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

E 7226 1231 44 No 60

Mr Erskine to Mr Austen Chamberlain — Received November 17

(No 944)

Sir *Sofia, November 15, 192*

With reference to Mr Noble's despatch No 727 of the 22nd October I have the honour to report that a Thracian Society, composed almost entirely of Thracian refugees from Bulgaria, has been formed in Sofia with the object of opposing the Turko-Bulgarian treaty which was signed at Ankara on the 18th October

2 Their grievances are I understand that the provisions of the Treaty of Constantinople whereby was recognised the right of Bulgarian emigrants to return to their former homes in Thrace and Adrianople and to have their lands and properties restored to them or receive adequate compensation for their properties in view of the fact that the abandoned Turkish properties in Bulgaria are, for the most part, considerably less in value than those in Macedonia and Thrace, and 2 that the Turkish properties in Bulgaria are only 11 per cent of the Bulgarian properties in Turkey amounts to 1 per cent As the details of the new treaty have not yet been disclosed it is impossible to say how far these grievances are justified

3 The society claims to have already obtained the promise of support not only from the Opposition, but also from a considerable number of members of Parliament belonging to the Government party

4 I am informed that a deputation from the society recently visited the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to formulate their objections and that in reply to their enquiry why, when a referendum to the Greeks had been refused by the Treaty of Neuilly after the treaty had been ratified by the Powers and by Bulgaria within the two years' trial allowed by the latter, the interests of the Thracians were entirely sacrificed, they were told that the alternative was that Bulgaria was such as to render the ratification of the agreement essential to enjoy whether it fully satisfied them They were further told that the treaty would not be published but that it was open to the Parliament for amendment

5 Not possessing any secret organisation on the lines of the Macedonian Brotherhood and being of comparatively recent origin, the Thracian Society is far from exercising the same influence as Bulgarian politics as does the former It is none the less a factor to be reckoned with, and the projected campaign of persistent abuse may prove a cause of serious embarrassment to M Tsankoff's Government and possibly lead to the rejection of the treaty

6 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople

I have, &c
WILLIAM ERSKINE

E 7378, 7378 44 No 61

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received November 30)

(No 863)

Sir *Constantinople, November 23 1925*

I HAD a certain amount of conversation at Angora with the Prime Minister and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the recent treaties and the language used about them by the President in his speech to the Assembly on the 1st November my despatch No 827 of the 4th November I was prepared to find their obstinately regarded Locarno Pact as an accomplished fait accompli and I think in stating the Turkish objections to that treaty I have given the principal reasons of that kind Of course the real principle secret was of the greatest importance, but fair use was to be made of it universally and was accepted by them as was recorded from the explanations I received in the sense in which it was intended from the explanations I received in the sense in which it was intended from the explanations I received in the sense in which it was intended

E 7370 109 44

No.

Letter from ... to ... Received November 1944

No. 53

Foreign Office November 23, 1944

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy No. 226 of the 24th March last, from the Political Secretary to the Government of India, on the subject of the ... Agreement, and to request that you will lay before Mr. Secretary Eden the enclosed Instrument of Ratification by His Majesty the King of the said Agreement.

2. The Government of India have been informed that the Agreement will enter into force on the 20th instant.

I have, etc.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 7370 109 44

No.

Letter from ... to ... Received November 1944

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I have, etc.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 7326 175 44

No.

Letter from ... to ... Received ... 1944

No. 175

Foreign Office November 30, 1944

I HAVE received your despatch No. 786 of the 6th October, in which you suggest that, in view of the ... passing into the hands of Arab owners, it might be desirable to ... the Arab Powers to take up the question of ... with the Government of Palestine.

2. I do not think that this would be wise. The Arabs, that is to say the ... Arab Powers, are ... and I do not think that we should ... to ... Palestine ... Arab ... Moreover, ... Arab ... Palestine ... Arab ... Palestine ... Arab ... Palestine

the schools and that Kurdish would be the official language of all these services The Commission held that it would be more advantageous for the territory to remain under Turkish sovereignty if this condition were not fulfilled and if League of Nations control were to terminate on the expiration in 1928 of the existing Anglo Iraq treaty It was evident that the League Council would be able to disregard so complete a recommendation of the commission which it had appointed for the express purpose of clearing before it all information and all suggestions which might be of a nature to assist it in reaching a decision and Mr Amery accordingly carried the Council on the 30th September that His Majesty's Government gladly gives an assurance that the existing system which does to a large extent carry out the recommendations of the commission will be continued and if anything more effective On the following day (the 4th September) Mr Ameri spoke with still greater emphasis

The Kurdish population is a serious responsibility for the Iraq Government, and we are prepared to state that in the event of Turkey not accepting the decision of the League Council we should be willing to submit the question of the future of the Mosul vilayet to the Permanent Court of International Justice

I would like to ask definitely whether in regard to the Kurdish population which might be affected by the decision of Turkey to the Turkish Government is prepared to give the assurance to the Iraq that we have just given Tewfik Rushdi Bey in his subsequent note evaded this point

4 His Majesty's Government trust that the Turkish Government will not fail to give effect to the assurances and to such other measures as may be recommended by the Council of the League to alleviate the hardships which will be entailed upon the inhabitants of the disputed territory by the transfer of the latter to Turkish sovereignty

5 I am to add that from the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government there is certainly no reason to regard with apprehension the conduct of the Kurds in Iraq whose government the Iraq authorities are responsible and as regards administrative measures to be taken for the benefit of the Kurdish districts of Iraq it happens however that the retention of the Kurdish districts which form the greater part of the Mosul Vilayet is a *sine qua non* for the very existence of the state of Iraq I should like therefore to quote the statement which Mr Amery made on this point to the following effect at Geneva

> As matter of fact Iraq owes its present extension of its territories and of a substantial portion of its revenue as well as of some of the best human material for the recruitment of its army to the fact that the final award materially weakened with the problem of governing a strong and indomitable Kurdish element would impose upon that task which would be a very difficult one indeed with the League's advice I do not expect the British Government or the British taxpayer to make themselves responsible

6 I would add that one of the most difficult factors in regard to the Turkish relations in general and with a view to some reasonable settlement of the Iraq frontier question in particular has been the necessity of allaying the Turks apprehensions in regard to a possible attempt on the part of the Kurds in Iraq to set up an independent Kurdish State I trust however that having regard to the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to the League and to their reasons which I have stated above the Turkish Government will see their way to attain this object by withdrawing the measure of autonomy which was granted to the Kurds in Iraq by declaring to extend in the sense of Mr Amery's declaration at Geneva There is however no reason why this should create any difficulty in the way of creating anything in the nature of an autonomous Kurdish State for the Kurdish districts of Iraq or of reserving the rights contemplated in the Treaty of Sevres and there is no reason why you should not in due course, make this clear to the Turks

I am &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No 64

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received December 3

(No 138)
Telegraphic *Constantinople, December 3 1925*

HIS Majesty's Consul at Trebizond reports that he learns on good authority that a consignment of small battery guns (Krupp) and field guns (Krupp

number carts and sheds said to be German, were landed at Trebizond from steamship 'Akdeniz' coming from Constantinople Nothing has transpired with regard to their departure from Trebizond for their ultimate destination

(Repeated to Baghdad No 55)

E 7512 194 44 No 65

Sir R Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received December 7

(No 880)
Sir *Constantinople, December 1, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the past week news has come in from the interior of disturbances in a variety of places Islet Pasha announced in the Assembly on the 26th ult not to matter the influence of certain sheikhs—i e Kurdish sheikhs who have been in the pay of Tsarist Russia and other evilly disposed persons who had been demonstrating before the Vali's house at Erzerum and had shouted out 'We do not want any gladiators of hotels,' meaning that they did not want to be governed by people who wore hats and tried to imitate the Europeans The Government took prompt measures and set up a court martial in Erzerum Over a hundred people have already been arrested six sheikhs or togas executed, and thirteen lesser penalties inflicted

2 When the above news was made known it also transpired that there had been disturbances of the same kind at Sivas as long ago as the 12th November when notice was posted up inciting the people to rebel against the present form of government Various members of the Ankara and Istanbul Press were also alleged to have encouraged the people not to resist by wearing of hats The Angora Independence Tribunal was moved to Sivas to deal with the situation and has now executed a number of the ringleaders in the disturbances Of various terms of penal servitude three persons were condemned to death, four to imprisonment for two years, two councillors and ex Deputy a lawyer and a former officer

3 Having regard to what occurred at Sivas, the Angora authorities were not surprised when, as stated, disturbances have been caused by the intrigues of mischievous persons who make instruments of the ignorant and foolish From Marash much the same kind of trouble is reported A crowd went to the mosque, took away some sacred flag and marched round the town shouting "We don't want any hats" Several ringleaders fell dead, and forty people are waiting trial At Rizeh town some kind of agitation has occurred, and all this we only know that the ex Sheikh of Nakshibendi has been sent to the spot From Trebizond I have a private letter from Mr Knight dated the 24th November from which I quote the following extract

> The most extraordinary rumours are circulating here in connection with a reported accident to Chief Secretary Nazim which I feel sure will have been widely circulated by Deputy Refet Bey Hamdi Kemal &c, and as about half the town now knows, it is widely believed that a certain exalted personage in Angora has been killed and it is undoubtedly a fact that a detective has been found dead in the street as the result of a bomb explosion Crowds are parading the streets and everybody is shouting the official version, despite the fact that the Ismir Official gazette is silent on the subject, but the foreign papers received up to the 18th give no inkling of anything being amiss We are quite cut off by telegraphs, ostensibly owing to the weather, but yesterday's Semi Sefai steamer 'per extraordinaire' brought letters, only a few papers which has increased the excitement"

4 The occurrence of the same type of outbreaks in five different places might suggest that there has been a matter attempt at a general rising But the distances separating these towns are so great that I incline rather to think that they are independent movements incited by the simultaneous application of the regulations for wearing hats. The cat is the outward sign and symbol of the whole policy of secularisation and modernism During the last few months the people have seen incredible changes to the Padishah driven out, crescents and sacred religious symbols removed from the number and divorce The next stroke was to see their religious leaders wearing the hat of the infidel and to be told to wear hats themselves It is surprising rather that the reaction was not stronger The Government seems to have mastered each rising with ease and to have the general situation well in hand An Independence Tribunal can be created at a moment's notice, and sent to any place

where there is trouble. Under the Law for the Restoration of Public Security of the 4th March 1925, the Government has power for a period of five years to use these tribunals for the repression of any kind of sedition. The Assembly has recently waived for a further period of six months its right to veto death sentences passed by the Independence Tribunals and the Popular party has already decided that next spring, when martial law has run for a year, the Kurdish districts must be extended for another twelve months. Meanwhile the Independence Tribunal for the Kharput district is sitting, with the attendance of both Greek and Turkish judges, and executions and other penalties are being carried out. The Smyrna Tribunal has recently been occupied with other things than sedition, to the detriment of other remedial work on a large scale.

3. When the draft law for the setting up of tribunals of independence was first discussed the opposition was encouraged by the attitude of Mr. Asquith during the war. His words in favour of Bryce, he was perhaps the strongest reactionary to Asserbe, did more than anything else to prevent the passing of the law in its original form. The present Turkish Constitution, the Master Passed Mr. Ismet Bey rejected with contempt the idea that the Assembly should be elected by universal suffrage. The Assembly is elected by the votes of the party which has obtained all the seats in the constituencies. The party is composed of a number of landowners, professional men and officials, who, whatever their political views may be, are all agreed in their opposition to the Government. The Assembly is elected by the votes of the party which has obtained all the seats in the constituencies. The party is composed of a number of landowners, professional men and officials, who, whatever their political views may be, are all agreed in their opposition to the Government.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 7513 2386 44 No.

Sir J. Tilley to Sir [illegible] Chamberlain — Received December 7

No. 89

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report by Mr. R. A. Leeper of his recent visit to Angora, with special reference to the present situation in general and to the Mosul question in particular. I considered this a matter of such importance that I decided to go myself to Angora, and I am glad that I did so. I found a strong feeling in favour of peace and a desire to avoid any action which might lead to a rupture with Great Britain. The Turkish Government is anxious to settle the Mosul question, but is unwilling to make any concessions which would be regarded as a humiliation by the Turkish people. The Government is also anxious to avoid any action which might lead to a rupture with Great Britain. The Turkish Government is anxious to settle the Mosul question, but is unwilling to make any concessions which would be regarded as a humiliation by the Turkish people. The Government is also anxious to avoid any action which might lead to a rupture with Great Britain.

2. I have the honour to request that Mr. Leeper's report may be treated as strictly confidential, as its publication would be highly embarrassing to the Turkish Government. I have the honour to request that Mr. Leeper's report may be treated as strictly confidential, as its publication would be highly embarrassing to the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

No. 90

Report on visit to Angora

I left Constantinople for Angora on the 26th November, accompanied by Colonel Woods and Mr. White, and returned on the 30th November. I was received and lodged in Angora as the guest of the Turkish Government. I had interviews with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of War, the Minister of Marine, the Minister of Aviation, the Minister of Railways, the Minister of Mines, the Minister of Forests, the Minister of Fisheries, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of Sport, the Minister of Culture, the Minister of Arts, the Minister of Science, the Minister of Technology, the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of War, the Minister of Marine, the Minister of Aviation, the Minister of Railways, the Minister of Mines, the Minister of Forests, the Minister of Fisheries, the Minister of Tourism, the Minister of Sport, the Minister of Culture, the Minister of Arts, the Minister of Science, the Minister of Technology, the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Trade.

General impressions.

The capital of Angora is a very large town. The streets are wide and the houses are mostly of one storey. The town is very dusty in summer and very muddy in winter. The streets are not paved. The houses are not built of stone. The town is not a place of any importance. The people are not very friendly. The town is not a place of any importance. The people are not very friendly.

The impression which Angora gives one at first sight is that of a large village. The streets are wide and the houses are mostly of one storey. The town is very dusty in summer and very muddy in winter. The streets are not paved. The houses are not built of stone. The town is not a place of any importance. The people are not very friendly. The town is not a place of any importance. The people are not very friendly.

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principles. It has always puzzled me to know how he could reconcile his personal views with the strong democratic tendencies of the present Government; and I had always imagined it could only be due to his loyalty to the Ghazi himself. If this loyalty is now sapped the President's position must indeed be threatened, for everything depends on the army, President and all, and if the corps of officers—naturally inclined to warlike courses—find in the Mosul question a popular rival leader who will lead them to fresh enterprises, as they love, there is no saying what complications may ensue.

3. From what precedes it will be clear that Major Greene was right in his report of the 9th November (my despatch No. 840) when he said that Turks were in earnest and not bluffing, and I have brought the point out in my telegram No. 134 of the 30th November, urging you to send a flash of lightning from the top of Mount Olympus bright enough to illuminate the darkness of even Angora, for Mr. Leeper brings out, quite clearly, in his report the almost incredible remoteness of the capital from all considerations of European politics and the astounding ignorance which envelops the minds of the average Turkish Deputy. To us it is clear that if Turkey wish to make an aggression on the British Empire, she could hardly choose a moment more favourable from the diplomatic point of view or circumstances in which His Majesty's Government would be more favourably placed for resenting it. But these men have forgotten everything that has happened since the battle of the Somme, and the fatal manner in which the Turkish Government has fostered the full sense of their hopes during the last few months now relates to the fact that creates a situation which really brings the present régime into serious peril. The use made of aeroplanes now in the great strength of the British Empire for nothing but force can appeal to the Angora mind. Great Britain has scarcely ever been more [illegible] than she now is, but fortunately she is still [illegible] and [illegible] as ever.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[illegible] No. 91

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proceed on the same lines. Kemal like Angora has a disputed frontier problem and the talk of the Angora Nationalists about Mosul is strangely reminiscent of what I have heard from Kemal Nationalists about Mosul. There are of course differences but I cannot help wondering whether a definite decision on Mosul would not produce the same result at Angora as the definite decision on Ismid as Kemal. It is difficult to believe that at the present nationalism can reconcile self-government with a divided allegiance.

The strength of this nationalism is quite a surprise to me. I had not realized how much stronger it is than the Egyptian. I hope to get a chance to talk with a few Deputies with whom I may discuss the new social reforms such as the growth of education and the position of women. I shall endeavour to see Ismid Pasha the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is reported to be a moderate. Mr Whittall is expected here next week and I am anxious to discuss the matter. I am very much struck at the difference Angora makes to the Consular Corps. Whereas at Constantinople they are all bored to death Mr Whittall tells me that he has had to refuse invitations to dinner. Mr Bryant the Belgian Minister is also here. He is a charming man and I shall see him. Mr Bryant is very much interested in the Mosul question. He was

members and two non-Moslems belonging respectively to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities, but chosen by the Government. Some appearance of giving effect to the second paragraph of article 42 was thus made. At the same time, the Government let it be known that it was going to adopt the provisions of Swiss law as regards personal and family status. Confronted with the question whether the Swiss law would not be acceptable to the non-Moslem communities, the three committees soon decided that each community as a whole must be consulted. The Turkish authorities then approached the Armenian Patriarchate and the Grand Rabbinate semi-officially, and urged that as personal and family status in Turkey was to be regulated in accordance with the practice in such a well-ordered State as Switzerland, they should formally renounce the provisions of article 42. The Armenian Patriarchate replied that, as all but its purely spiritual functions had been taken from it during the war, it was unfortunately unable to pronounce on such a matter. The Grand Rabbinate answered to much the same effect and suggested a plebiscite, hoping that the impracticability of such a measure might defer the evil day. But the Turks were not to be daunted and continued to press both communities. The Armenians yielded first. The spiritual and lay councils attached to the Armenian Patriarchate have remained in being since the war, and in the end the Turks obtained from the Acting Gregorian Patriarch, these two councils, all the local Gregorian bishops and a number of Armenian notables, a signed statement that they would accept the Swiss law on personal and family status, including civil marriage. They did not, however, make an explicit renunciation of article 42, and they had no legal capacity to represent the Armenian community. The Armenian Catholics and the Armenian Protestants took up the same attitude as their Gregorian brethren, holding that resistance was useless, and that if the new law made possible marriages contrary to the law of their Church, the Church would merely refuse to recognise them. The Armenian Catholic Church has managed to avoid signing any declaration. In the same way the Jewish community, although it felt that merely theoretical right was better than nothing at all, had no serious objection to the proposed law, and decided to bow to the inevitable. A committee of Jews, with no legal representative character but including, I believe, the Grand Rabbi, therefore signed the same declaration as the Armenians had done.

2. With the Greek community, which is more numerous, the Turks had much more trouble. The Greeks felt that the treaty's provisions about personal and family status were the most important part of the minority clauses. It was not so much a privileged position that they sought as something to differentiate them individually and collectively from the Turks at a time when Turkish policy is to Turkify every aspect of what remains of Greek life in Turkey. Scenting resistance in the Greek community, the Turks appointed a so-called "Commission d'Initiative," composed of some half-dozen Greeks. When the commission showed a tendency to negative the Turkish proposals, the Turkish authorities brought its numbers up to twenty-two by adding other Greeks, whose interests in this country made them particularly susceptible to Turkish official influence. This commission was considerably moved by the speech which a Greek lawyer had the courage to make, in spite of the presence of Turkish police, denouncing the proposals as an attempt to make the Turkish Government violate an article which had become law through its ratification by the Grand National Assembly and to bring into disrepute so sacred an instrument as the National Pact, the fifth article of which guarantees to the minorities their treaty privileges. The commission then added to itself some thirty more members, who were reluctantly elected by the various parishes and as reluctantly came to the discussion, in some cases under compulsion by the police. A few days before the meeting the authorities arrested, on an absurd charge of supplying political and military information to Greece, eight or ten members of the commission who seemed likely to oppose the Government's wishes, and kept them under arrest until the day after the discussion was over. This simplified the course of things in the commission considerably, but, even so, the delegates showed such reluctance to commit themselves to any decision that the police, who were present as before, received orders to lock the doors and allow no one to go home until he had signed a formal renunciation of the first paragraph of article 42. The position of the Greek community is therefore rather worse than that of the Armenians and Jews. They realise that even if the Swiss law is adopted there is nothing, for example, to prevent the Grand National Assembly from repealing it one day and reverting to polygamy.

3. The Turkish authorities have made great efforts to secure the consent of the Greek Patriarchate, but the patriarchate, by pleading its legal incapacity and

by using other pretexts, has so far been able to avoid compliance. Nevertheless, the Greek community fear that as the Patriarch is an old man in failing health, his signature may yet be obtained by some trick. The influence of the patriarchate is indeed feeble nowadays. During the armistice it excommunicated a man named Diaminidi, who had broken into the Phanar with a mob of roughs. Diaminidi went to law against the patriarchate, but abandoned his claim before any verdict was given. After Allied evacuation, however, the Public Prosecutor continued the case, and in the end the Holy Synod was condemned individually and collectively to pay £T. 2,000 damages. The verdict was confirmed in cassation, and the patriarchate has had no choice but to pay.

4. In common with the Jews, the Greeks find their schools more and more paralysed by increased Government control and increased insistence on the use of Turkish. In common with the Armenians, the Greeks continue to suffer from a ruthless application of the law on abandoned property. All three communities are dwindling because their young men leave the country rather than face service in labour battalions. And now the Turkish authorities show signs of gradually taking over Greek, Armenian and Jewish hospitals and other charitable institutions. The whole tendency of Turkish policy is to assimilate the non-Moslems as far as possible to Turks, and to make their situation so unfavourable that numbers of non-Moslems will continue to leave the country.

5. I had some conversation a few days ago with M. Jean Politis, who, till last summer, was Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora, and is now the Greek delegate to the Mixed Exchange Commission. He spoke in the most depressed tone of the position to which the Greek community was being brought by these manœuvres, and at one moment hinted at the fact that the Great Powers were also signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, article 42, of which was being so flagrantly violated in the spirit. I replied that the Powers were certainly aware of the drift of events in Turkey, and if they took no action it was because they thought that any protests they might formulate might make things worse for the local Greeks and certainly would do no good. This proposition M. Politis did not attempt to dispute; he and I agreed that if Turkey were a member of the League of Nations, that body might undertake action with some slight hope of beneficent result, though both of us are unfavourably impressed by the weak manner in which the existing Mixed Exchange Commission understands its duties. But we also agreed that, while there are no signs whatever of the Turks meaning to relax their pressure on the native non-Moslem communities, the day when Turkey will join the League of Nations now seems more distant than ever.

6. If His Majesty's Government consider that something should be done, the only thing I can think of would be a note by one or more Governments, as you may think best, addressed to Angora and aimed at preserving rights. The note might recite that information has been received about renunciations of rights under article 42 by certain non-Moslem communities; that the information comes only from the press; that it is a principle of law that the provisions of a treaty can only be varied with the consent of all its signatories, who have the right to exercise their own unfettered judgment in deciding whether or not they will assent to any variations that may be proposed to them; and that it would therefore be interesting to know whether the Turkish Government proposes to bring before the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne the action of the non-Moslem communities, if, indeed, any action by them has been taken.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 68.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 16, 1925.*

MILITARY activity in Trebizond district.

Your telegram No. 141.

Consul reports movement of heavy guns by night towards Erzerum and constant appearance of new officers. This may be connected with disaffection of Laz elements

as result of recent abolition of the fez, which has recently necessitated severe repressive measures in the Trebizond district.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 57.)

No. 69.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 17, 1925.*

MY despatch No. 1159 of 4th December: Mosul.

Turkish Ambassador recently went from here to Paris, where he saw Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is, however, not known whether he communicated to him substance of my conversation of 4th December, or whether the serious language which I held has in fact reached Angora.

Have you in any way repeated the warning at Constantinople, or can you ascertain whether Turkish Government have been fully informed of views expressed by me? If not, can you take appropriate measures for leaving them under no misapprehension?

[**E 7918/194/44**] No. 70.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 908.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 15, 1925.*

IN my despatch No. 880 of the 1st instant I had the honour to report upon the internal situation. On the 12th instant Ismet Pasha made another long statement in the National Assembly, from which a little more information may be gathered. The Prime Minister stated that as the revolts in the different areas were simultaneous, as the time chosen was when the Government was busy with the Mosul question, and as emissaries who had been caught had newly arrived in the different districts, he had come to the conclusion that the whole thing was one movement which had been worked "from abroad." He did not specify whether he meant that it had been instigated by a foreign country or by the ex-Sultan or ex-Caliph, but since he spoke of it as "a new manifestation of a reactionary system," I presume he meant to suggest that it originated from San Remo. The Government would naturally seek to throw on the ex-Imperial family the blame for a situation which seems in reality to have been produced by their own hasty measures.

2. The Pasha quoted various rumours which were current in the affected areas—namely, that on the reopening of the Assembly in October there had been such indignation among the Deputies that the Opposition had risen from 20 to 170, that Ismet Pasha himself was dead, that another nakshbandi dervish had arisen as successor to Sheikh Said, and that Turkish widow women were being sent away to Russia. He also gave a few more details of the disturbances. In Erzerum two priests had led a mob to the Government House and threatened the Vali. At a village near Rizeh on the Black Sea, the inhabitants, led by a priest, had risen to the cry, "We are heading straight for irreligion. We must stop the Government from irreligion." These few admissions of Ismet Pasha's suggest that the Government has had to deal, and is indeed still dealing, with a very nasty situation. The population of Eastern Turkey, being much less open to intercourse with Europeans, clings more grimly to religious custom and has naturally been more resentful at the introduction of the hat. Mr. Knight at Trebizond has found since the movement began that no one has dared to come near him, but such information as he has been able to obtain is to the same effect. He reports that it is the hat which has caused all the trouble in Erzerum and in Trebizond itself. The whole population, he says, resent deeply this attempt to civilise them, and even the army officers appear to be altogether against the emancipation of women. Fear of the Independence Tribunal—which, wherever it goes is welcomed with speeches and bouquets—alone keeps the people quiet. Mr. Knight's information about the Rizeh district is that the Laz country seemed about to rise, and that the "Hamidieh," which was finally driven back by bad weather, bombarded the Laz villages to keep them quiet. According to the press the Lazes had planned an armed attack on Rizeh, and over 130 people are being tried there, although Ismet Pasha, who seems to have concealed

the true dimensions of the various risings, only admitted that there were some thirty under arrest. There seems to have been trouble enough at Kerasund for the Independence Tribunal to propose to visit it shortly. At Marash the agitators appear to have by no means been a mere rabble, as the Prime Minister at first intimated, but to have included at least two ex-Deputies.

3. Information which I have received from another source confirms the report of general disaffection in North-East Anatolia. The placemen of the Government, the army officers, the spies and the agents of the Popular party are happy. The rest of the population is much more openly opposed to the Government than is Constantinople or Smyrna. The disaffection is not only Kurdish in its origin but also Turkish. As information from the east of Turkey is so scarce, I think it worth while to enclose notes, which I have received from an informant, of the observations of M. A. Mille of the "Journal des Débats." M. Mille is a Levantine, and I fancy inclined to sacrifice truth to rhetorical effect, but his remarks may be taken as substantially correct. He penetrated from Trebizond viâ Baiburt and Erzerum as far as Kars and Mush, and you will observe that one of his main impressions was the desolation of the country.

4. Nearer home we hear that even in Panderma, which should be grateful to the Ghazi for the elimination of its Greek majority, some twenty people have had to be arrested, while in Stambul the publication by a priest of a tract entitled: "Hats and imitating the Frank" has led to the arrest of the author, of an Armenian charged with printing it, and of about thirty other people, of whom some belong to the professional class. Constantinople is therefore threatened with a visit by the Independence Tribunal, but meanwhile preparations are being made to set up a colossal statue of the Ghazi on the most historic spot in Constantinople, Seraglio Point.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 70.

Report of a Conversation with M. Albert Mille, Correspondent of the "Journal des Débats," on the Subject of his Journey in Trebizond, Erzerum, Kars and Mush.

General Impressions.

The strangled feeling in one's breast ("serrement de cœur") which is caused by the sight of the ruined condition of Trebizond develops and deepens as one advances into the interior. About 20 kilom. from the east one enters the wilderness—nothing but waste and desolation, with hardly a stone left standing in the ruined villages one passes. Outside of the towns M. Mille reckons that there cannot be more than three or four inhabitants to the square kilometre. And if conditions were bad between Trebizond and Erzerum, they were worse between Erzerum and Kars. He was not able to go to Bitlis from Mush, but he was told that things were even worse down there.

Roads.

The roads, generally speaking, were very bad. Travelling by car, an average of 15 kilom. was rarely attained. It was constantly necessary to leave the main road for by-tracks. There was no pretence of a *chaussée* between Erzerum and Mush. The magnificent road built by the Russians from Kars to Trebizond is falling rapidly into ruin. Although there is abundance of metalling piled by the roadside there is hardly any attempt at upkeep. Crushing machines and heavy rollers worked by mazout are lying by the roadside every few miles, but they have rusted into unusableness. In one place M. Mille saw some superficial repairs being rolled in by roller pulled by two bullocks.

Railways.

Of the railway from Erzerum towards Trebizond (42 kilom.) and Erzerum Sarikamishe, barely 19 kilom. are in a condition to be used. Most of the locomotives have been dismantled, the engines being sold to Laz boat-owners and used as auxiliaries.

Security.

Public security seemed to be efficiently maintained by gendarmerie all along the routes travelled by M. Mille. There are guard-houses every few kilometres along the main routes as well as in any inhabited villages and at all passes into the hills. The men are smartly turned out and seemed well shod on the whole, some wearing sandals. Brigandage seems to have been pretty well stamped out, even in the Dersim district. The roads are frequently patrolled, and it is customary to accompany villagers with one gendarme, a rifle being also given to a villager and exchanged at each stop as he goes along.

Military.

There were very few troops to be seen in the whole of this region. Even in Sarikamishe and Kars there seemed to be a great scarcity of men and a striking disproportion in the number of officers. When Feizi Pasha visited Sarikamishe it was difficult to get together 250 men for his guard. The officers were all smartly dressed; the men frequently in rags. The officers were abominably chauvinistic, but in spite of their smart uniforms were content to live in filthy unhygienic surroundings. Even in Kars the paucity of men was noticeable and the forts appeared to be very neglected. The old Russian stone barracks near the station are used by the Turks but looked half abandoned.

Population.

In Erzerum the population has fallen from 60,000 to barely 19,000 souls. The depreciation in other towns is proportionately heavy. Baiburt seemed to be the only exception. Kars was practically a heap of ruins except for one-quarter on the hillside. Greeks have been deported, Armenians massacred, Circassians and Russians driven away. On the road to Kars were several villages which looked as though they might have been prosperous but which were quite abandoned. An attempt had been made to settle some Moslem Circassians here, but the policy was negatived from Angora, which did not want a local settler with affiliations across the frontier. Consequently, the once-smiling region is rapidly degenerating into a wilderness. The population, both urban and rural, has shrunk so greatly that there is a tendency on the part of the peasants to take up pastoral pursuits rather than agriculture, as there are no towns to supply and no means of exporting cereals. The cost of transport is prohibitive.

Politics.

In the towns, the equivalent of the *bourgeoisie* and the wealthy landowners are bitterly, if secretly, hostile to Angora. The Ghazi is generally referred to ironically as Sa Majesté. But the terror of the Independence Tribunals daunts any outspoken opposition. The people, and especially the serfs in the villages, are more sympathetically inclined to Angora. They are glad to see the influence of sheikh and tekke crushed and do not particularly care about the suppression of the sheriat and Caliphate. All they say is: Give us roads and railways and let us work and trade in peace. M. Mille found that everybody regretted the departure of the Greeks and yearned for a restoration of the conditions of Tsarist occupation. The impetus given to all trade by the roads and railways policy of the Russians is the one bright spot in local memory. The Bolsheviks are disliked very generally and thoroughly. They are held responsible for the downfall of Tsarist Russia and their doctrines find no echo in native philosophy. Nevertheless, the best buildings in all these internal towns are usually in the occupation of the Bolshevik consuls, surrounded by staffs of from fifteen to twenty sub-agents, mostly Jews and Armeno-Russians. M. Mille says three circumstances have contributed to dispose the people to progressive ideas: first, the misery from which all are suffering, which has destroyed their faith in the old order. Secondly, the influence of the four divisions who returned from the Austrian front. These men belonged to these regions, and while they suffered less than any other Turkish troops, they came into contact with European conditions and had their eyes opened. Also quite a number brought back Hungarian and Austrian wives. Thirdly, the benefits of the Russian occupation were also very educational.

Economical.

Apart from the reduced trade in nuts and tobacco in the coastal regions, there is very little doing at any of these places in the interior. The herds of cattle and

sheep that used to be driven up towards Erzerum from the south seemed to have found more profitable outlets into Mesopotamia and Syria; in Erzerum it is believed that it was in order to hide this fact that the authorities decreed a quarantine against the southern regions alleging the outbreak of cattle disease and sheep-rot. A caravan arrived from Diarbekir for the first time in two years just previously to the visit of M. Mille. This lack of trade has led to a crisis in Erzerum because on the one hand the shopkeepers have been unable to sell their goods and equally unable to pay for those imported.

Educational.

M. Mille was much impressed by the work of the lady teachers in some of the places he visited, notably Erzerum, where there are thirteen pluckily doing their best in adverse surroundings. He thought less of the male teachers. He visited the *école normale* in Erzerum and found that they were teaching 300 youths to be the most outrageous chauvinists he had encountered. It was denied that Greece had ever made any contribution to civilisation and humanity.

Mosul.

M. Mille raised the question of Mosul in his talk both with officers and civilians. They all seemed to think that Mosul could easily be captured, but thought that it would not be worth while risking war with Great Britain to obtain. All said it would be better to come to terms with Britain and accept the sum of £20 million. This figure of 20 millions was so generally mentioned that M. Mille was very struck by it and gained the impression that it might have been inspired.

Travelling Conditions.

M. Mille did most of his travel in motor-cars. They are fairly plentiful in Erzerum, and the Russian drivers are very popular. Food and lodging were the great difficulties. The hotels were unfit for human accommodation and the food equally unfit for consumption. At several stops he got the greatest comfort by hiring a big wagon full of straw for sleeping quarters for the night.

No. 71.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 20, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 149.

I ascertained that Turkish delegate had not heard of your conversation of 4th December. Of course this does not mean that it has not been duly reported to Angora, but I made it a pretext for handing to delegate copy of your despatch No. 1159, and of declaration you made after delivery of League's decision.

No. 72.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople, December 23, 1925.*

TEXT of Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Paris on 17th December is published in papers this morning. Substance is as follows:—

1. If either of contracting parties is attacked by one or several States the other contracting party will maintain neutrality.

Note.—Military manœuvres which do not injure interests of one of the parties are not to be defined as military action.

2. The contracting parties will not attack one another or join in any political alliance directed against military or naval security of the other party.

3. The agreement comes into force from date of ratification for a period of three years. If not denounced six months before date it expires it will be prolonged automatically by one year.

Three protocols annexed provide for following points :—

Outside obligations already mentioned, both parties reserve for themselves complete freedom in their relations with other Powers.

Political alliance of above-mentioned article 2 of treaty embraces financial or economic agreements with other States directed against the two contracting parties.

The contracting parties agree to discuss procedure to be followed for settlement of disputes which cannot be solved through ordinary diplomatic channels.

Text as published by bag.

Treaty seems intrinsically unimportant and is probably intended to reassure Turkish public opinion and to restore prestige of Government by suggesting idea that secret articles exist. Official press organ in its comments hints that such is the case.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 59.)

[E 8099/1944/44] No. 73.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 930.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 23, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 147 of to-day's date, reporting the signature of a Russo-Turkish treaty at Paris on the 17th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith the full text of the treaty, together with the three protocols annexed thereto, as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié," the official organ of the Turkish Government at Angora.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Text of Russo-Turkish Treaty, signed at Paris on December 17, 1925.

Préambule.

LE Gouvernement de la République turque, d'une part, et le Gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, d'autre part, considérant qu'il est conforme à l'intérêt des deux pays de rechercher et de fixer les bases nécessaires pour le renforcement des relations normales suivies qui existent entre les deux pays, et de l'amitié sincère qui les unit, ont désigné, à cet effet, comme délégués, Tevfik Ruchdi Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République turque, et M. Georges Tchitchérine, Commissaire aux Affaires extérieures de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, lesquels ont arrêté, d'un commun accord, ce qui suit :

1. Dans le cas où un ou plusieurs États se livreraient à une action militaire contre l'une des parties, l'autre partie contractante s'engage à garder, envers la première, la neutralité.

(N.B.—Les manœuvres militaires qui ne lèsent pas les intérêts d'une des parties ne rentrent pas dans la définition d'action militaire.)

2. Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à ne se livrer, contre l'autre partie, à aucune agression. Elle s'engage également à ne faire partie d'aucune alliance ou entente de caractère politique contractée avec un ou plusieurs États et conclue spécialement contre l'autre partie, et, également, à n'entrer dans aucune alliance ou entente de caractère politique contractée avec un ou plusieurs États et qui serait dirigée contre la sécurité militaire et maritime de l'autre partie.

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage également à ne participer à aucun mouvement hostile dirigé par un ou plusieurs États contre l'autre partie.

3. Cet accord entre en vigueur dès la date de sa ratification, pour une période de trois ans.

Dans le cas où, six mois avant la date de l'expiration de l'accord, une des parties ne le dénoncera pas, il demeurera en vigueur une année encore, par tacite reconduction.

A ce traité sont joints les trois protocoles que voici :

Protocole No. 1.

Les deux parties tombent d'accord pour déclarer qu'en dehors des limites des obligations prévues par le présent traité, les parties se réservent pleine et entière liberté dans leurs relations de toutes sortes avec les tierces Puissances.

Protocole No. 2.

Les parties contractantes sont tombées d'accord pour déclarer que le terme "de caractère politique" employé dans l'article 2 du traité signé à la date d'aujourd'hui comprend également tous accords financiers ou économiques que des États concluraient entre eux et qui seraient dirigés contre l'une des parties.

Protocole No. 3.

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à entrer en pourparlers pour fixer d'un commun accord les procédés à suivre pour résoudre tous litiges qui surgiraient entre elles et qui ne pourraient être résolus par la voie diplomatique ordinaire.